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ARTICLES
SHAW V. RENO: A MIRAGE OF GOOD
INTENTIONS WITH DEVASTATING RACIAL
CONSEQUENCES
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR. *
GREGORYA. CLARICK **
MARCELLA DAVID ***
In this Article the authors critically examine the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Shaw v. Reno, which held that a North Carolina minority-majority voting
district of "dramatically irregular" shape is subject to strict scrutiny, absent suffi-
cient race-neutral explanations for its boundaries. While the authors assert that
such race-conscious redistricting will meet the burdens of strict scrutiny, given the
peculiar history of the southern states, they here argue that Shaw is fundamen-
tally flawed They examine the history of political racism in North Carolina
leading up to the 1991 redistricting plan. They then examine the Court's mis-
guided presumptions that race-conscious districting plans are akin to political
apartheid and segregation, reinforce racial stereotypes, and damage our system of
democracy. The authors argue that minority-majority congressional districts--
unlike apartheid and segregation-are intended to include racial minorities in
the politics from which they were for so long locked out, thereby furthering plural-
ism in Congrest The authors therefore call on the Court to modify Shaw before
its misguided reliance on shape and appearance over intent and history results in
a rollback of recent political gains by African-Americans, gains which have
brought America a step closer to the ideal of a truly representative democracy.
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BACKGROUND: STATEMENTS OF NORTH CAROLINA
PUBLIC OFFICIALSC ONGRESSMAN George White of North Carolina, African-Ameri-
can, farewell speech to the United States Congress, January 29,
1901:
I want to enter a plea for the colored man, the colored woman, the
colored boy, and the colored girl of this ountry ....
.. This, Mr. Chairman, is perhaps the negroes' temporary farewell
to the American Congress; but let me say, Phoenix-like he will rise up
some day and come again. These parting words are in behalf of an
outraged, heart-broken, bruised, and bleeding, but God-fearing people,
faithful, industrious, loyal people-rising people, full of potential force.
The only apology that I have to make for the earnestness with which
I have spoken is that I am pleading for the life, the liberty, the future
happiness, and manhood suffrage for one-eighth of the entire popula-
tion of the United States.'
North Carolina Governor Charles Brantley Aycock, December 1903:
I am proud of my State, moreover, because there we have solved the
negro problem.... We have taken him out ofpolitics and have thereby
secured good government under any party and laid foundations for the
future development of both races. We have secured peace, and ren-
dered prosperity a certainty.
2
North Carolina Governor Thomas Walter Bickett, August 23, 1920:
In North Carolina we have definitely decided that the happiness of
both races requires that white government shall be supreme and unchal-
lenged in our borders. Power is inseparably linked with responsibility;
and when we deny to the negro any participation in the making of laws,
we saddle upon ourselves a peculiar obligation to protect the negro in
his life and property, and to help and encourage him in the pursuit of
happiness.3
John Parker, upon accepting the 1920 Republican Party nomination
for governor of North Carolina:
I have attended every state convention since 1908 and I have never
seen a Negro delegate in any convention that I attended. The Negro as
a class does not desire to enter politics. The Republican party of
North Carolina does not desire him to do so. We recognize the fact
that he has not yet reached the stage in his development when he can
1. 34 Cong. Rec. 1635, 1638 (1901) (statement of Rep. White).
2. Charles B. Aycock, Speech before the North Carolina Society, Baltimore (Dec.
18, 1903), in The North Carolina Experience: An Interpretive and Documentary History
415 (Lindley S. Butler & Alan D. Watson eds., 1984) (emphasis added).
3. Thomas W. Bickett, Message to the General Assembly of 1920, in Public Letters
and Papers of Thomas Walter Bickett, Governor of North Carolina 1917-1921, at 72
(R.B. House ed. 1923) (emphasis added).
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share the burdens and responsibilities of government. This being true,
and every intelligent man in North Carolina knows that it is true, the
attempt of certain petty Democratic politicians to inject the race issue
into every campaign is most reprehensible. I say it deliberately, there
is no more dangerous or contemptible enemy of the state than the man
who for personal or political advantage will attempt to kindle the flame
of racial prejudice or hatred.4
Campaign literature of Willis Smith,' successful North Carolina candi-
4. John Parker, An Address Upon Accepting the Republican Nomination for Gov-
ernor (Apr. 18, 1920), quoted in Richard L. Watson, The Defeat of Judge Parker: A
Study in Pressure Groups and Politics, 50 Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. 213, 218 (1963) (empha-
sis added).
Parker, appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 1925, was
nominated by President Hoover on March 21, 1930, for appointment as an associatejustice of the United States Supreme Court.
Walter White, executive secretary of the NAACP, telegraphed Judge Parker
on March 26, 1930, inquiring if he had actually made the [above] statement,
and if so whether he still held the same views .... [H]e apparently did not
answer the telegram, and thus the NAACP launched a vigorous campaign
against Parker's confirmation. The NAACP was aided by some two hundred
Negro newspapers and the National Association of Colored Women. The offi-
cial protest was filed with the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the senators
were bombarded with telephone calls, telegrams, letters, petitions, and visita-
tions ....
Walter White argued that no one who favored keeping the Negro out of
politics, as Parker seemed to have done in 1920, could approach Fourteenth
Amendment questions with that 'dispassionate, unprejudiced, and judicial
frame of mind which would enable him to render a decision according to the
Constitution.'
Id. at 218-19. Parker's nomination was defeated on May 7, 1930 by two votes. See id. at
230.
Some years later, as a court of appeals judge in Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529
(E.D.S.C. 1951), Judge Parker voted to deny the integration of South Carolina schools,
reasoning that South Carolina could lawfully offer "separate but equal" schools for that
state's white and black schoolchildren. Id. at 533-37. He denied plaintiff's assertion that
"separate but equal" violated the equal protection guarantee, holding that
[t]he federal courts would be going far outside their constitutional function were
they to attempt to prescribe educational policies for the states in such matters
.... For the federal courts to do so would result, not only in interference with
local affairs by an agency of the federal government, but also in the substitution
of the judicial for the legislative process in what is essentially a legislative
matter.
Id. at 536. Judge Waring filed a vigorous dissent to Parker's position, writing:
From [the] testimony, it was clearly apparent, as it should be to any thoughtful
person... that segregation in education can never produce equality and that it
is an evil that must be eradicated.... [A]ll of the legal guideposts, expert testi-
mony, common sense and reason point unerringly to the conclusion that the
system of segregation in education ... must go and must go now.
Segregation is per se inequality.
Id. at 547-48 (Waring, J., dissenting). In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), the Supreme Court overruled Judge Parker's holding.
5. Willis Smith ran against and defeated Dr. Frank Graham, a distinguished educa-
tor and former president of the University of North Carolina. See Julian M. Pleasants &
Augustus M. Burns III, Frank Porter Graham and the 1950 Senate Race in North Caro-
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lina (1990); see also Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics 106-17 (3d ed.
1965). Jesse Helms, who was a campaign worker for Smith, was later elected to the
United States Senate, using racist, though more subtle, campaign literature. See Kath-
leen H. Jamieson, Dirty Politics 80 (1992).
6. Campaign literature of Willis Smith, 1950, reproduced in Lubell, supra note 5, at
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The final oppositional campaign ad of North Carolina Senator Jesse
Helms, 1990:
The... ad... showed the plaid-shirted arms and white hands of a
male, a simple gold wedding ring on the third finger of his left hand,
opening, presumably reading and then crumpling a rejection letter as
the announcer says, 'You needed that job, and you were the best quali-
fied. But they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota. Is
that really fair? Harvey Gantt says it is. Gantt supports Ted Ken-
nedy's racial quota law that makes the color of your skin more impor-
tant than your qualifications. You'll vote on this issue next Tuesday.
For racial quotas: Harvey Gantt. Against racial quotas: Jesse
Helms. 
7
Excerpts from the United States Supreme Court majority opinion in
Shaw v. Reno,8 written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 1993:
Put differently, we believe that reapportionment is one area in which
appearances do matter. A reapportionment plan that includes in one
district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise
widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who
may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin,
bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid .... 9ll
[A]ppellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted
a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be under-
stood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts
because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justifica-
tion .... Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.10
I. FROM DARKNESS TO A NEW DAWN?
From 1901 to 1992, the one constant in North Carolina congressional
politics was the triumph of white supremacy. For that state's African-
Americans, these were nine decades of exclusion (or absence) from the
United States Congress." Similarly, for all of these years, African-
Americans were absent from the congressional delegations of Alabama,
Florida, South Carolina, and Virginia. 12
When in 1992, North Carolinians elected Eva Clayton and Mel Watt,
two African-Americans, to the House of Representatives of the United
7. Jamieson, supra note 5, at 97 (quoting campaign advertisement of Jesse Helms).
8. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
9. Id. at 2827 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 2832 (emphasis added).
11. See African-Americans in the U.S. Congress, 1870-1993, infra app. A.
12. See id. African-Americans were absent from the congressional delegations of
Louisiana until 1991, of Mississippi until 1987, of Tennessee until 1975, and of Georgia
and Texas until 1973. See id.
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States Congress, many Americans-black and white-were ecstatic, be-
lieving they were experiencing a new dawn in American congressional
racial politics. 3 Not since 1901 had an African-American represented
North Carolina in Congress, despite the candidacy of numerous, quali-
fied black individuals and the fact that more than 20% of North
Carolinians are and were African-American.' 4 Absent representation,
throughout this period, the rights of North Carolina's African-Ameri-
cans were stripped and their interests ignored; for decades, North Caro-
lina politics were marred by the forcible exclusion of African-Americans
from the political process,' 5 by race-baiting' 6 and by extreme racial po-
larization at the polls,' 7 in short, by the marginalization of the political
power and interests of African-Americans.
The 1991 North Carolina congressional redistricting 8 was a signifi-
cant step toward correcting these past injustices. Pursuant to that enact-
ment, in two of North Carolina's twelve congressional districts, African-
Americans comprise a slight majority-approximately 53%-of eligible
voters. 9 In the 1992 congressional election, voters in those two districts
chose African-American representatives, Eva Clayton and Mel Watt,
two veterans of North Carolina politics, highly regarded by their constit-
uents and congressional peers.
Notwithstanding these representatives' service, a suit, Shaw v. Barr,
20
was brought by two white Duke University law professors and local vot-
ers," challenging the pluralism occurring in North Carolina's congres-
sional delegation. These plaintiffs have sought to invalidate the 1991
redistricting which enabled Representatives Clayton and Watt to take
office, claiming that the redistricting violates the Equal Protection
13. See; e.g., Steve Berg, Court Will Get Case of 'Racial Gerrymandering, Star Trib-
une, Mar. 27, 1994, at IA; Affidavit of Representative Mel Watt, 2 (sworn to Mar. 23,
1994) (submitted as evidence in Shaw v. Hunt, 92-202-CIV-5-BR (E.D.N.C.)).
14. See African-Americans in the U.S. Congress, 1870-1993, infra app. A; Shaw v.
Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993) (20% of North Carolina's voting population is Afri-
can-American); infra notes 110-23 and accompanying text (discussing electoral difficul-
ties faced by black candidates).
15. See infra notes 64-96 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 99-109, 120-25 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 110-26 and accompanying text.
18. 1991 N.C. Extra Sess. Laws, Ch. 7.
19. See Southern U.S. Congressional Districts by Party and Black Vote, 103rd Con-
gress, First Session, infra app. B. The First and Twelfth Districts (like other similar
districts) are commonly referred to as "minority-majority districts" because, in these,
minorities comprise the majority of voters.
20. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev"d sub nom. Shaw v. Reno,
113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
21. Professors Robinson 0. Everett (lead counsel) and Melvin G. Shimm (plaintiff)
teach at Duke University School of Law, where this year there is only one African-Amer-
ican on the school's full-time faculty. Their colleague, Professor Jerome McCristal Culp,
Jr., has written often about his lonely experience at that school. See. e g., Jerome M.
Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the
Legal Academy, 77 Va. L. Rev. 539 (1991).
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Clause. 2 Plaintiffs have focused their attack on the Twelfth District's
shape, contending that its untraditional configuration renders it constitu-
tionally infirm.23
Initially, a three-judge district court panel dismissed the case. The dis-
trict court majority held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim as they
failed to allege (and could not prove) discriminatory intent, a prerequisite
to an equal protection claim:
Simply put .... the plaintiffs here have not alleged-nor could they
prove under the circumstances properly before us on this record-an
essential element of their equal protection (and parallel Fifteenth
Amendment) claim: that the redistricting plan was adopted with the
purpose and effect of discriminating against white voters such as plain-
tiffs on account of their race. The requisite intent, for equal protection
and Fifteenth Amendment purposes, is a legislative intent to deprive
white voters, including plaintiffs, of an equal opportunity with all other
racial groups of voters-on a statewide basis-to participate in the
political process and to elect candidates of their choice.24
The three-judge panel further held that plaintiffs could not prove consti-
tutional injury:
The plan demonstrably will not lead to proportional underrepresenta-
tion of white voters on a statewide basis. Within the specifically chal-
lenged districts ... the mere fact that white voters (assuming the sad
continuation for yet another season of racial bloc voting) will elect
fewer candidates of their choice than if they were in white-majority
districts is not a cognizable constitutional abridgement of their right to
vote, and the two plaintiffs who alone are registered to vote in one of
the challenged districts, the Twelfth, will suffer no cognizable constitu-
tional injury if her or his particular candidate should lose by virtue of
the district's racial composition.25
The court concluded by recognizing that "questions about the political
and social wisdom of the North Carolina congressional redistricting
plan's creation of two tortuously configured black-majority districts...
are in the end political ones. "26
Plaintiffs' assault on racial pluralism, however, was resuscitated on ap-
peal. The Supreme Court reversed the district panel, stating that "ap-
22. See Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 467-68.
23. See id. A prior challenge brought by the Republican Party of North Carolina,
objecting to the district as a political gerrymander, was dismissed. See Pope v. Blue, 809
F. Supp. 392, 395 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992). The Barr court described
District Twelve as "a thin band, sometimes no wider than Interstate Highway 85, some
160 miles long, snaking diagonally across piedmont North Carolina .... " Barr, 808 F.
Supp. at 464. The plan divides precincts, counties, and towns. See id. A map of the
Twelfth District is appended to the Supreme Court majority opinion. See Shaw, 113 S.
Ct. at 2833.
24. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 472 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 473 (citation omitted).
26. Id.
1600 [Vol. 62
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pearances do matter,"" and questioning race-conscious districting that
results in bizarre districts such as North Carolina's Twelfth District.28
The Court held that such "dramatically irregular" districts29 are subject
to strict scrutiny, absent sufficient race-neutral explanations for their
boundaries.3" Under strict scrutiny, such districts would be upheld only
where they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.3I
To support its conclusion, the Court identified three potential "harms"
that might result from "dramatically irregular" districting plans: the
"uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid," the reinforcement of
racial stereotypes, and possible damage to "our representati[onal] democ-
racy" that might result from politicians' assuming that they represent the
interests of only one race.3 2
Implicitly equating racial classification with racial discrimination, the
Court's "harm" analysis abandoned settled principles of equal protection
law.33 Yet the distinction between classification and discrimination un-
derlies all cases considered by the Court since its decision in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke34 addressing state attempts to rem-
edy past racial discrimination. Indeed, the Shaw Court tacitly acknowl-
edged the significance of the distinction by stressing that "[t]his court
never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible
in all circumstances." 35 The internal tension between the Court's
"harm" analysis and its recognition that race-conscious remedial legisla-
tion can be justified and legal was left unresolved.36
This tension was created because the Court abandoned the require-
ment of proving direct constitutional injury-here voter dilution." The
concept of voter dilution is well established:
27. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993).
28. See id. at 2832.
29. Id at 2820.
30. See id at 2832.
31. See id
32. See id at 2827. Proceeding in the context of an appeal from the grant of 12(b)(6)
dismissal, the Court did not find such harms, but rather posited their potential existence.
33. See The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 144, 199-
204 (1993) ("[Tjhese ... analytical moves enabled the Court to substitute an ideal of
color-blindness for the anti-discrimination principle at the core of the Equal Protection
Clause.") (citations omitted).
34. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (race-conscious
admissions not based on set racial quotas are constitutionally permissible).
35. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. The classification/discrimination distinction had been
maintained in a variety of circumstances. For example, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990), the Court found permissible racial classifications in-
tended to promote diversity and remedy past discriminatory practices. See also Laurence
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1577-85 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing circumstances
in which the Supreme Court has appropriately upheld gender distinctions).
36. Revealingly, the Court describes the notion of a "color-blind" constitution as an
"ideal." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. In trying to accomplish that ideal, the Court had
previously sanctioned race-conscious remedies. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
37. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. The plaintiffs' failure to allege dilution was key to
the district court panel's dismissal of the action. See Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 473
1994] 1601
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The essence of racial vote dilution.., is this: that primarily because of
the interaction of... racial polarization... with a challenged electoral
mechanism, a racial minority with distinctive group interests . . . is
effectively denied the political power to further those interests that
numbers alone would presumptively give it in a voting constituency
not racially polarized."
Yet the Court here specifically noted that the plaintiffs failed even to
allege voter dilution:
[A]ppellants did not claim that the General Assembly's reapportion-
ment plan unconstitutionally 'diluted' white voting strength. Rather,
appellants' complaint alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters
into separate districts on the basis of race violated their constitutional
right to participate in a 'color-blind' electoral process.39
The theoretical right to "participate in a 'color-blind' electoral process,"
never before recognized by the Court, was accepted as a substitute for the
direct injury of voter dilution.' ° But what sets lawful classifications apart
from outright discrimination is the fact that discrimination injures those
adversely classified.4
Absent injury-and the Supreme Court accepts there was no voter di-
lution here-the classification should be lawful. The Shaw Court's aban-
donment of the touchstones of discriminatory harm and purpose in
(E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), discussed supra
notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
38. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 355 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (citations omitted),
modified sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
39. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
40. Id. The majority states that racial classifications " 'are by their very nature odi-
ous to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.'" Id.
(quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). However, the very cases
relied upon by the majority in support of permitting a claim to proceed without allega-
tions of direct harm were cases in which extreme harm was alleged by plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Hiraboyashi, 320 U.S. at 86-88 (loss of liberty and property through wartime internment
of Japanese American citizens); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (denial of right to
marry across racial lines).
41. For example, it was the allegations of direct constitutional injury which gave
white plaintiffs standing to raise "reverse" discrimination claims in Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (white teachers laid off before black teachers with less
seniority raised valid equal protection claim); see also Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2845-49 (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's abandonment of traditional injury requirement
and discussing cases).
In addition, under the Court's analysis, plaintiffs need not show discriminatory pur-
pose. Since deciding Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), however, the Court has
required plaintiffs alleging indirect harms-there, adverse impact-to allege discrimina-
tory purpose. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (challenge to village rezoning plan adversely im-
pacting black residents required proof of discriminatory intent); Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1985) (challenge to criminal provision which resulted in dispropor-
tionate numbers of black convictions required proof that statute was enacted with that
purpose); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (challenge to death penalty stat-
ute's disproportionate impact on black defendents required proof that statute was enacted
"because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect").
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voting rights cases where a congressional district's shape does not com-
port with some obscure notion of regularity lacks any principled basis
under its equal protection precedent.4 2
With plaintiffs' urging, the Court has created law that could make
Shaw v. Reno equivalent for the civil rights jurisprudence of our genera-
tion to what Plessy v. Ferguson4 3 and Dred Scott v. Sandford" were for
prior generations. In the specific context of voting-rights jurisprudence,
the Court has made it possible that North Carolina's (and other states' as
well) congressional representation might once again become lily white by
providing the basis for invalidating all minority-majority districts.45
Many districts will fail through the difficulty of applying strict scrutiny.
For example, one court's application of the narrowly tailored standard to
minority-majority districting has proved fatal to a districting plan. Hays
v. Louisiana,' the first case to apply strict scrutiny to minority-majority
districts, held that a black voting population of 63% was in excess of that
"adequate to ensure that blacks could elect a candidate of their
choice."'47 The guidance provided by that court was that a percentage of
"55%-and probably less" would be adequate.4" We fear that the
Supreme Court, faced with the unworkable application of an inappropri-
ate standard, will next move to invalidate all minority-majority
42. Moreover, the Court recognized that traditional principles of compactness and
contiguity in congressional districting are not constitutionally required. See Shaw, 113 S.
Ct. at 2827. Justice Souter aptly pointed out that, because these are not constitutionally
required, "their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by
the Court today." Id. at 2849 (Souter, J., dissenting). Indeed, Congress itself has consid-
ered and rejected compactness requirements several times since 1929, when the last ap-
portionnent statute requiring compactness, the 1911 Apportionment Act, expired. See
Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1932) (citing congressional debate concerning compact-
ness requirement); see also H.R. 970, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 2349, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981). Congress has consistently determined that effective representation of a
district is not dependent upon the shape of the district.
There is no reasoned basis for concluding that politically similar but geographically
diverse voters cannot be adequately represented in Congress by the same representative.
Indeed, our national government is based on the opposite assumption. National legisla-
tors typically campaign on issues transcending local political boundaries. For example,
Congressman Watt's campaign was pro-labor and pro-urban development. Presidential
and senatorial candidates are elected by widely dispersed coalitions responding to com-
mon issues and concerns such as health care and fiscal responsibility.
43. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (determining that "separate but equal" treatment of African-
Americans is lawful).
44. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05, 407 (1856) (determining that blacks, as "a
subordinate and inferior class" of beings, had no rights of citizenship and noting that "at
the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of the United
States was framed and adopted .... [blacks] had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect ... ").
45. Again, the term "minority-majority" refers to districts-like North Carolina's
First and Twelfth Districts-where racial minorities comprise the majority of voters.
46. 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993).
47. Id at 1206-08.
48. Id (emphasis added). Cf. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 358 n.21
(E.D.N.C. 1984) (discussing testimony that 60% or 65% minority voting-majority is re-
quired), modified sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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districts.49
Accordingly, we believe that Shaw is one of the most important civil
rights cases decided by the United States Supreme Court since Brown v.
Board of Education5° and Baker v. Carr.51 While the majority opinion
undoubtedly was written with good intentions, unwittingly it has created
the potential for devastating racial consequences.52
In this Article, we analyze Shaw v. Reno to determine whether it was
"wrongly decided." 3 We evaluate the potential adverse political conse-
quences of Shaw and whether it could lead to the significant diminution
throughout the South of recent gains by African-Americans in Con-
gress.54 In our analysis, we focus on the Shaw case itself and on North
Carolina's history of political oppression of African-American citizens,
both because Shaw arose in North Carolina and because that state is a
fair proxy (and even a beneficent one) for the histories of other southern
states. In light of that history and for the good of the American demo-
cratic ideal, the standards set by this "wrongly-decided" decision must be
modified and its application in North Carolina and other states must be
strictly limited.
History illuminates the flaws of the Supreme Court's decision, in par-
ticular the Court's purported reliance on doctrines of oppression. In
Shaw, the Supreme Court for the first time used the term "political
49. As Professors Aleinikoff and Issacharoff note:
So we are left with an unsatisfactory theory that yields an unsatisfactory stan-
dard for its implementation. Shaw does not adequately instruct lower courts as
to how they should review subsequent claims, it does not resolve the ongoing
claims of the filler people, and it does not answer the more troubling questions
that lie close to the heart of any system of districting.
T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race And Redistricting: Drawing Constitu-
tional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 588, 651 (1993).
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting "separate but equal" in context of public schools),
supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
51. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (stating that representatives must be fairly apportioned across
the population).
52. Shaw has created a cottage industry for its critics. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes &
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, "and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 483, 485 (1993)
("Shaw will not only constrain the districting process constitutionally but, through its
radiating effects on statutory interpretation, may reshape the districting process at its
core."); Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 49, at 650 ("At the end of the day, Shaw
remains an enigmatic decision ....").
53. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980), Justice Rehnquist joined Jus-
tice Stewart's view that "Plessy v. Ferguson was wrong" when decided. This view has
been endorsed by two members of the Shaw majority. See Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2813 (1992) ("[W]e think Plessy was wrong the day
it was decided."). We submit that Shaw was similarly wrong when decided, and must be
promptly modified.
54. Notably, elections in the past few years have nearly doubled the number of Afri-
can-American members of Congress. See African-Americans in the U.S. Congress, 1870-
1993, infra app. A; Congressional Representation (House and Senate), 1871-1993, infra
app. C.
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apartheid."" Yet the Court's comparison of North Carolina's voting
districts to political apartheid is based on a profound misperception of
apartheid and of those districts.16 The Shaw majority's concern that mi-
nority-majority districts will polarize the nation and work to the detri-
ment of African-Americans is unfounded. In congressional districts
throughout America, white congressmen represent the majority of Afri-
can-Americans without unduly polarizing the nation."' Enabling Afri-
can-American congressmen to represent some African-Americans-as
well as whites in their districts-does not raise concerns different from
those raised by white congressmen representing blacks and is not, as the
Supreme Court hints, political apartheid.58
Nor does minority-majority districting perpetuate stereotyping, or fos-
ter segregation. Rather, it is a modest policy of inclusion appropriately
considered by the North Carolina legislature.
Designed so that North Carolina Governor Aycock's promise to take
the Negro "out of politics"5 9 and North Carolina Governor Bickett's
plan that "white government shall be supreme and unchallenged"'
would not return, there is compelling justification for the creation of
North Carolina's challenged districts. Under any scrutiny, the flaws in
Shaw limit its value, yet, even under the strict scrutiny that Shaw appears
to require, North Carolina's 1991 redistricting, which serves to remedy
the ills of lingering historic discrimination, is constitutionally sound.
II. "A PAGE OF HISTORY"-1896-1945
In Shaw v. Reno,6' the Supreme Court held that race-conscious redis-
tricting is lawful if "narrowly tailored to further a compelling govern-
55. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
56. As did the dissenters, we submit that "it strains credulity to suggest that North
Carolina's purpose in creating a second majority-minority district was to discriminate
against members of the majority group by 'impair[ing] or burden[ing their] opportunity
... to participate in the political process.'" itL at 2838 (White, J., dissenting and quoting
the majority) (alteration in original).
57. Approximately 8.66 million, or 42.5%, of the country's 20.38 million voting age
blacks are represented by African-American congresspersons. See David A. Bositis, Joint
Center for Pol. & Econ. Stud., The Congressional Black Caucus in the 103rd Congress,
tbl. 16 (1993) (for number of black voters) (copy on file with the Fordham Law Review);
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1990 Census Population and Housing Profile: Congressional
Districts of the 103rd Congress (Census Doc. No. 1990 CPH-L-1 17), tbl. 2 (for number
of black voters in minority-majority districts) (copy on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
58. We agree with Justice Blackmun:
It is particularly ironic that the case in which today's majority chooses to aban-
don settled law and to recognize for the first time this 'analytically-distinct'
constitutional claim .... is a challenge by white voters to the plan under which
North Carolina has sent black representatives to Congress for the first time
since Reconstruction.
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. Supra note 2 and accompanying text.
60. Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
61. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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mental interest."' 62 The phrases "race conscious," "narrowly tailored,"
and "compelling governmental interest" do not have the specificity of
scientific description. The only way to wisely evaluate minority-majority
districting plans in light of these specific terms is to view them in proper
historical perspective, applying the maxim of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes: "a page of history is worth a volume of logic."'63
The redistricting plan at issue in Shaw v. Reno, for example, is permis-
sible in view of the historic circumstances of North Carolina's extensive
legitimization of racism in every sphere of public and private life during
the post-Reconstruction era. The North Carolina plan is justified by the
State-imposed racism-imbedded in the laws of North Carolina regulat-
ing housing, marriage, employment, public conduct and indeed every
facet of life-that was reinforced and exacerbated by the private and pub-
lic use of fraud and violence to deter African-Americans in North Caro-
lina from voting.'
In fact, the very housing patterns that define the shape of the chal-
lenged districts emerged as a product of North Carolina's history. To
avoid white disapprobation and violence even when not state imposed,
African-Americans in North Carolina conducted their lives and settled
in communities where it was thought they would minimize physical hos-
tility by whites and maximize the few economic options permitted by
racially discriminatory hiring practices. Accordingly, the dispersal of
blacks throughout North Carolina demands a district shape different
from that which would protect the interests of white voters. Otherwise,
black voters will once again be penalized by North Carolina law and
culture, which forced them to live in distinct communities where most
black North Carolinians continue to reside.65 In short, North Carolina
and white North Carolinians caused the "circumstances" that now make
constitutionally permissible the relatively modest race consciousness of
the 1991 redistricting legislation.
The post-Reconstruction era of racial suppression in North Carolina
began with the "White Supremacy Campaign" of 1898. Professor
62. Id. at 2824, 2832.
63. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
64. A list of North Carolina's numerous, patently racist statutes is on file with the
Fordham Law Review.
65. In Louisiana, a snake-like district that follows the riverbeds was recently invali-
dated. See Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1199-1200 (W.D. La. 1993). Amaz-
ingly, the court ignored the historical significance of the district's economic base:
"[c]otton and soybean plantations, centers of petrochemical production, urban manufac-
turing complexes, timberlands, saw mills and paper mills, river barge depots and rice and
sugar cane fields." Id. These "segments" of the state economy, viewed by the Hays court
as diverse, have the acknowledged commonality of disadvantage. Id. at 1203 n.48 ("At
this momemt in history black people in the South (and generally in America) are-on
average-poorer and less well-educated than their white counterparts. Moreover, blacks
in largely segregated communities are probably poorer--on the average-than blacks in
more integrated communities.").
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Prather's description of the violence and intimidation of the 1898 elec-
tion, at the hands of racist "Red-Shirts," is instructive:
[Clrowds of Red-Shirts were waiting for Governor Russell at
Laurinburg on his return from voting in Wilmington. Anticipating
that some violence would be inflicted upon him, the train conductor
suggested that he ride in the baggage car to avoid personal injury, and
the Governor obligingly took a prepared seat among the baggage.
When the train stopped at Laurinburg, it was surrounded and boarded
by Red-Shirts, shouting: 'Where is Russell?' 'Where is the Governor?'
'Bring him out!' Those outbursts were accompanied by all sorts of
vulgar language. There were rumors of threats to assassinate Gover-
nor Russell, and a race riot in the state appeared imminent. It was
pathetic, indeed, to see a chief executive of a state subjected to such
crass humiliation. This incident not only made a mockery out of the
two-party tradition, but the democratic process as well.66
That the Republican governor was so intimidated by race-mongers that
he hid in a baggage car so that his fellow white citizens would not assassi-
nate him serves only to underscore the legitimacy of the fear felt by Afri-
can-Americans were they, against the wishes of the white community,
either to exercise their franchise rights or to move into white residential
areas.
The Red-Shirts' tactics of violence and intimidation dominated the
election of 1898, when "armed with Winchester rifles and shotguns....
[t]hey stalked about, frightening Republicans, Fusionists, and blacks
away from the polls."'67 Two years later, volatile elections again rocked
North Carolina and resulted in passage of legislation disenfranchising
African-Americans with the use of literacy tests and poll taxes:
As in 1898, Red-Shirts with all types of guns could be seen through-
out the Black Belt loitering around the polls in riotous manner. To
avoid violence, blacks as a body just did not vote. The elections were
most gratifying to the Democrats. Aycock won the governorship
against his Republican rival, Adams, by a decisive vote of 186,650 to
126,296, the largest majority ever given a gubernatorial candidate.
Likewise, the [disenfranchisement] amendment was carried. To win
the election, intimidation, physical terror, 'fraud and rascality have
reigned supreme,' complained Senator Butler. 68
After Governor Aycock was inaugurated, he made clear that the
state's primary governmental obligation was to disenfranchise the Negro
to assure white supremacy. The implementation of the Aycock disen-
franchisement scheme in 1900 incorporated all means possible to defeat
George White, the last African-American from North Carolina to serve
66. H. Leon Prather, Sr., The Red Shirt Movement in North Carolina 1898-1900, 62 J.
Negro Hist. 174, 179 (1977) (citation omitted).
67. Id.
68. Idl at 182.
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in the United States Congress until Eva Clayton and Mel Watt were
elected in November 1992.
Congressman White's defeat was part of a pervasive conspiracy
throughout the southern United States to keep the colored man "in his
place" and to destroy his "manhood-suffrage. ' 69 White's defeat symbol-
ized the use of governmental, vigilante and other forces that denied the
African-American what he had pleaded for: "the same chance for
existence.",70
Governor Aycock of North Carolina was determined, at all costs, to
deny blacks first class citizenship and to preclude them from the right to
participate in the governmental process. In December 1903, Aycock
spoke before the North Carolina Society of Baltimore and proclaimed:
I am inclined to give to you our solution of this problem. It is, first, as
far as possible under the Fifteenth Amendment to disfranchise him;
after that let him alone, quit writing about him; quit talking about him,
... Let the negro learn once for all that there is unending separation of
the races... that they cannot intermingle; let the white man determine
that no man shall by act or thought or speech cross this line, and the
race problem will be at an end.7 1
Governor Aycock set the tone for his successors. Several years later,
Governor Locke Craig described and supported a proposed amendment
to the North Carolina Constitution under which "the white men of
North Carolina shall make and administer all the laws."'72 And, in his
presentation to the all white legislature of 1920, Governor Thomas W.
Bickett said:
69. 34 Cong. Rec. 1635-38 (1901).
70. Id. at 1638.
71. Aycock, supra note 2, at 415 (emphasis added). Governor Aycock stressed his
supposed "regard" for African-Americans:
These things are not said in enmity to the negro but in regard for him. He
constitutes one third of the population of my State: he has always been my
personal friend; as a lawyer I have often defended him, and as Governor I have
frequently protected him. But there flows in my veins the blood of the domi-
nant race; that race that has conquered the earth and seeks out the mysteries of
the heights and depths. If manifest destiny leads to the seizure of Panama, it is
certain that it likewise leads to the dominance of the Caucasian. When the
negro recognizes this fact we shall have peace and good will between the races.
Id.
72. Locke Craig, Campaign Speech on the Suffrage Amendment, in Memoirs and
Speeches of Locke Craig: Governor of North Carolina, 1913-1917, at 34 (May F. Jones
ed., 1923) (emphasis added). He further explained:
This one section will wipe out the negro vote in North Carolina. Of the 120,000
negro voters it will disfranchise 110,000 of them, practically all of them. It will
be good-bye to all negro office holders, and all those who base their hope of
office on the negro vote .... There is only one kind of a white man in North
Carolina that will be disfranchised, and that is the white man who ... denies his
race and his color.., and swears that he is a negro or the son of a negro, or the
grandson of a negro, and that white man will be disfranchised.
Id. at 36-38.
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Candor and my deep friendship for and my abiding interest in the per-
manent happiness of the negro race compel me to add that it is the
settled conviction of the best people in all political parties in the South
that it is necessary for the protection, the progress and the happiness of
both races for the government to be run by white people, and it is the
unalterable determination of the whites to keep in their own hands the
reins of government.7 3
Some public officials in other states were even less subtle than North
Carolina governors in declaring their hatred of the colored man, willfully
manipulating the political process to exclude blacks from voting. Judge
Chrisman of Lincoln County, Mississippi, for example, described his
state's experience to its constitutional convention in 1890:
Sir, it is no secret that there has not been a full vote and a fair count in
Mississippi since 1875-that we have been preserving the ascendancy
of the white people by revolutionary methods. In plain words, we have
been stuffing ballot boxes, permitting perjury and here and there in the
State carrying the elections by fraud and violence until the whole ma-
chinery for elections was about to rot down.74
The explicit racism in government spanned from almost every south-
ern state public official to, at times, the White House. As an example, in
1896 President Grover Cleveland, distraught about a false rumor that a
black had been present at an official White House function, made a fren-
zied denial: "It so happens that I have never, in my official ... position,
either when sleeping or waking, alive or dead, on my head or on my
heels, dined, lunched, or supped, or invited to a wedding reception any
colored man, woman, or child."'75
Seven years after the Supreme Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson, incor-
porating segregation into our Constitution, President Theodore
Roosevelt, who was less hostile on the race issue, invited the moderate
Booker T. Washington for an informal lunch at the White House.76 In
response, the Memphis Scimitar wrote: "The most damnable outrage
which has ever been perpetrated by any citizen of the United States was
committed yesterday by the President, when he invited a nigger to dine
with him at the White House."'7 7 Senator Benjamin Tillman of South
Carolina said: "Now that Roosevelt has eaten with that nigger Washing-
ton, we shall have to kill a thousand niggers to get them back to their
places." 78 Georgia's governor was sure that "no Southerner can respect
73. Bickett, supra note 3, at 292 (emphasis added).
74. Burke Marshall, Federalism and Civil Rights 13-14 (1964) (quoting remarks of
Judge Chrisman).
75. George Sinkler, The Racial Attitudes of American Presidents: From Abraham
Lincoln to Theodore Roosevelt 227 (1971) (emphasis omitted).
76. See William A. Sinclair, The Aftermath of Slavery 187-96 (2d ed. 1905).
77. Id. at 187.
78. Id.
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any white man who would eat with a negro."79
Senator James K. Varderman of Mississippi, who often used Booker T.
Washington as a foil for his racist rhetoric, once commented:
I am just as much opposed to Booker Washington as a voter, with all
his Anglo-Saxon reinforcements, . . . as I am to the coconut-headed,
chocolate-covered, typical little coon, Andy Dotson, who blacks my
shoes every morning. Neither is fit to perform the supreme function of
citizenship. 80
Contempt for African-American suffrage was well pronounced in the
political arena.8
The courts were often as insensitive as the state governments on the
issue of assuring equal justice for African-Americans.82 In many cases,
appellate courts upheld convictions despite prosecutors' references to
black defendants and witnesses in such racist terms as "black rascal, 83
"burr-headed nigger," 84 "mean negro,"85 "big nigger," 6 "pickaninny, 's
79. Id. at 188. Not to be outdone by others in racist rhetoric, James K. Varderman,
then governor of Mississippi, wrote in his newspaper:
It is said that men follow the bent of their geniuses, and that prenatal influences
are often potent in shaping thoughts and ideas in after life. Probably old lady
Roosevelt, during the period of gestation, was frightened by a dog, and the fact
may account for the qualities of the male pup that are so prominent in Teddy. I
would not do either an injustice, but am disposed to apologize to the dog for
mentioning it.
Id. at 196.
80. 1 Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal For Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights As a
National Issue 8 (1978) (citation omitted). See also David L. Lewis, W.E.B. Du Bois:
Biography of a Race 1868-1919, at 257-61 (1993) (describing white rejection of Washing-
ton's conciliatory efforts).
81. African-Americans had few allies. Even the women's suffrage movement placed
great reliance on the argument that the votes of white women would serve to dilute the
"adverse" impact of black male suffrage mandated by the Fifteenth Amendment. Suf-
fragettes Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony "opened the way to... bigotry"
in their influential National Suffrage Association. Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle:
The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States 316 (rev. ed. 1975). Indeed, the
National Board of that organization issued a statement noting that "granting suffrage to
women who can read and write and pay taxes would insure white supremacy without
resorting to any methods of doubtful constitutionality-" Id. at 317 (citation omitted); see
also William H. Chafe, The American Woman 15 (1972). The Equal Suffrage League of
Raleigh, North Carolina-a chapter of the National American Woman's Suffrage Associ-
ation-was particularly strident in its calls for women's suffrage, limited through the
application of literacy tests to white women, to ensure white domination. See Glenda E.
Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North
Carolina, 1896-1920, at 439-47 (1993) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill) (forthcoming UNC Press, 1995).
82. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts:
Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 479, 521-43 (1990).
83. State v. Miles, 98 S.W. 25, 31 (Mo. 1906).
84. Adams v. State, 216 S.W. 863, 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919).
85. Green v. State, 105 P.2d 795, 797 (Okla. Ct. App. 1940).
86. State v. Hubbard, 195 P.2d 604, 605 (Kan. 1948).
87. People v. Curry, 218 P.2d 153, 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
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"mean nigger,"" s "three nigger men,"" "niggers, '9° and "nothing but
just a common Negro, [a] black whore." 9'
Moreover, even the institution of the Supreme Court was not immune
from racist influence:
Mr. Hoover nominated as Justice of the United States Supreme Court
John J. Parker of North Carolina, in spite of the fact that Parker had
opposed the right of Negroes to vote. We have been told that Parker
was willing to repudiate this stand but that the White House refused to
let him; at any rate, while Mr. Hoover hastened to explain Parker's
labor decisions, he treated his anti-Negro attitude with disdainful si-
lence and despite advice and pleading, insisted upon sending this nomi-
nation to the Senate. It was finally defeated by a narrow margin by the
influence of the Negro and labor vote and despite every effort of the
administration to force it through.9 2
From birth to death, even in defense of the country, innumerable as-
pects of legitimized racism affected the lives of most African-Americans
every day. In World War I, African-American soldiers fought abroad
and lost their lives for what President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed was
the war to make the world "safe for democracy." Yet, at home there was
segregation, not democracy. During World War II, thousands of Afri-
can-American soldiers lost their lives for what President Roosevelt said
was the fight for the Four Freedoms. But at home, many African-Ameri-
cans were denied the Four Freedoms, including the right to vote.
Nearly every achievement was gained only through struggle. For ex-
ample, consider the experiences of John Hope Franklin, now the James
B. Duke Professor Emeritus at Duke University, and a former colleague
of the plaintiffs in Shaw v. Reno:
[John Hope Franklin] has achieved all of [these academic honors] de-
spite having had to cope with the outrageous indignities that can be
visited on a black person in our society. When his father, who was an
attorney in Indian Territory before it became Oklahoma, moved to
Tulsa, the building in which he had acquired a law office was burned
down by a white mob, and for months his father had to work out of a
tent. As a boy riding on a Jim Crow train in Oklahoma, John Hope
and his mother were put off the coach by a white conductor and left
stranded in the dust.
When as a graduate student he sought to pursue historical research
at the archives in Raleigh, he was not permitted to sit with white re-
searchers but was shunted off to an isolated chamber. The Library of
Congress was still worse... [he] could not eat with ... colleagues at
88. Quarles v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Ky. 1951).
89. Thornton v. State, 451 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
90. Thornton v. Beto, 470 F.2d 657, 658 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920
(1973).
91. Hilson v. State, 258 S.W. 826, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1924).
92. W.E.B. Du Bois, Herbert Hoover, The Crisis 39 (Nov. 1932), reprinted in 2 Writ-
ings in Periodicals Edited by W.E.B. Du Bois 675 (1983) (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1983).
16111994]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
any downtown restaurant, not even at the greasiest People's Drug
Store counter. Nor, after having fought a victorious war against fas-
cism, was there a downtown movie a black person could go to, or a
downtown hotel at which, in the nation's capital, a black person could
stay. That was John Hope's experience as a young scholar.
During this same period, on a train journey in North Carolina from
Greensboro to Durham, he was compelled to stand even though there
were ample seats in an adjacent coach-for those coach seats were re-
served for whites, who sat there grinning at his discomfort. They were
Nazi prisoners of war. 9
3
III. THE PERSISTENCE OF SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL RACISM IN
NORTH CAROLINA IN THE LAST FOUR DECADES
Through the mid-20th century, voting by black North Carolinians was
nearly non-existant, as literacy tests prohibited blacks from exercising
their political rights.94 Although voting slowly increased through the
course of the century, by 1948 still only 15% of North Carolina's blacks
were registered to vote.95 Even as courts began to take action against de
jure segregation, the displacement of African-Americans from America's
and North Carolina's political life continued. After the North Carolina
literacy requirement was eliminated in 1961, North Carolina continued
to require voting registrants "of uncertain ability" to read and copy the
North Carolina Constitution, a practice that continued for another dec-
ade, disproportionately disenfranchising black citizens. 96
Even after the demise of Jim Crow dejure segregation, racial discrimi-
nation against blacks continued. Beyond the realm of political empower-
ment, discrimination governed all facets of life including neighborhood
development, business development, employment patterns, schooling,
and criminal justice. There can be little doubt that such discrimination
was able to occur because African-Americans were excluded from civic
life. Through the 1960s, every significant decision-making agency in the
state-public and private-was completely dominated by whites even
though their policy decisions had full effect in black communities.97 In
93. William E. Leuchtenburg, Tribute: John Hope Franklin, 42 Duke L.J. 1022,
1023-24 (1993).
94. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 360 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub
nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). From 1900 through 1919, blacks also
were prohibited from voting, as North Carolina enforced a voting poll tax. See John V.
Orth, The North Carolina State Constitution-A Reference Guide 119 (1993).
95. See J. Morgan Kousser, After 120 Years: Redistricting in North Carolina 30-31
(Mar. 22, 1994) (submitted as sworn testimony in Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR
(E.D.N.C.)).
96. Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 359 (quoting Bazemore v. Bertie County Bd. of Elections,
119 S.E. 2d 637 (N.C. 1961)).
97. See Alex Willingham, Report on Certain Questions Involving Race and North
Carolina Congressional Redistricting with Reference to the 1990 Round 5-6 (Mar. 22,
1994) (submitted as sworn testimony in Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR
(E.D.N.C.)).
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fact, North Carolina did not elect its first black state legislator until 1968,
at a time when it refused to abolish patently discriminatory multimember
districts.98
A. The Return of Race-Baiting Campaigns
After the Jim Crow Era closed, the exclusion of blacks from the polit-
ical process took different forms; in particular, racial rhetoric once again
inflamed North Carolina politics to divide voters along racial lines. In a
1950 Democratic Party senate primary, Willis Smith took on incumbent
Frank Graham, appealing to white voters' racism. Smith supporters dis-
tributed leaflets warning: "WHITE PEOPLE WAKE UP! ... FRANK
GRAHAM FAVORS MINGLING OF THE RACES." 99 From that
point forward, although direct barriers to voting fell, white North
Carolinians increasingly appealed to white prejudice and fear to polarize
the electorate and marginalize African-Americans and candidates who
might protect their interests.
In 1954, supporters of Alton Lennon distributed a false endorsement
of rival Ken Scott by a black political leader, in order to discredit him.
Scott responded with an adamant endorsement of segregated schools. 1"o
In 1956, two of three North Carolina representatives who refused to en-
dorse the "Southern Manifesto," which vowed to resist the desegregation
order of Brown v. Board of Education, were defeated at the hands of seg-
regationist groups.10
In 1960, I. Beverly Lake ran for North Carolina governor on a segre-
gationist platform, while his opponent, Terry Sanford, was accused of
being "soft" on the race issue.' 0 2 In the 1964 gubernatorial election,
Lake again defended segregation, prompting primary rivals to oppose the
pending federal civil rights acts. Concurrently, presidential candidate
Barry Goldwater, pressing for the support of North Carolina voters, as-
serted his opposition to civil rights legislation as well.' 03
B. The Aftermath of the Civil Rights Act
The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1965 did little to quell racial
appeals in North Carolina politics. Although the Act has encouraged
black voter registration, which between 1960 and 1982 rose in North
98. See Kousser, supra note 95, at 21-22.
99. Supra note 5 and accompanying reproduction.
100. See Harry L. Watson, Race and Politics in North Carolina, 1865-1994, at 13
(submitted as sworn testimony in Shaw v. Hunt, 92-202-CIV-5-BR (E.D.N.C.)); see also
Alton Lennon Forces Flood State with 'Phony' Race Issue Leaflet, Raleigh News & Ob-
server, May 28, 1954, at 1. The fact that a supposed endorsement by a black leader
proved such an effective tool for discrediting Scott is striking evidence of white voters'
hostility to black candidates and black issues, an attitude that still prevails. See infra
notes 104-33 and accompanying text.
101. See Watson, supra note 100, at 13.
102. See id. at 14.
103. See id. at 14-15.
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Carolina from 39.1% to 50.9 % of the black voting-age population,°4 not
until the challenged redistricting has the Act enabled African-Americans
in North Carolina to choose representatives who would protect their
interests.
After passage of the Voting Rights Act, subtle (and not so subtle) ap-
peals to white racism in elections persisted in North Carolina elections,
intimidating African-American voters, punishing candidates for protect-
ing "black" interests or for being African-American, and dividing voters
along racial lines.
In 1966, two Democratic congressmen drew fire and were defeated for
acceding to federal pressures for desegregation in an election marred by
"violent intimidation against black families who proposed to register
their children in formerly all-white schools."' 05 George Wallace's 1968
presidential campaign appealed to voters' fears of court-ordered bus-
ing.' O6 And, Jesse Helms, in his bid for Senate in 1972, signalled his
racial animus with slogans like "He's one of us.'
0 7
In the 1960s, if not beyond, the North Carolina legislature continued
to dilute African-American political rights with the redistricting process.
Time and again the legislature approved gerrymanders to dilute the vote
of African-Americans living in the well-organized, black community of
Durham County. In 1965, for example, a proposal to create a "Research
Triangle District" of Durham, Wake, and Orange Counties was rejected
in favor of a gerrymander placing Durham with conservative Forsyth
County.'0 8 This "solution" led to the 16-year-term of L.H. Fountain-a
conservative who opposed the civil rights movement, ignoring the inter-
ests of Durham County's substantial African-American population.' 0 9
This district finally was broken up in 1982, after a protracted fight
marred by neutral sounding, race-based appeals. But even in Durham
County's new district, African-Americans fared no better. 1o Although
black voters represented 40% of this district's Democratic Party electo-
rate,"' due to the extreme racial polarization of North Carolina politics,
104. See id. at 15.
105. Id. at 16.
106. In an ad placed in The Charlotte News by the Wallace Campaign, a school bus
was pictured with the text:
If you're wondering why more and more millions of your fellow Americans are
turning to Governor Wallace: Follow, as your children are bused. All across
town. Governor Wallace as President will let you and your local schools decide
what is best for your children.
Charlotte News, Oct. 29, 1968, at 5C.
107. See Watson, supra note 100, at 17.
108. See id. at 23-24.
109. See id.
110. See Kousser, supra note 95, at 36-41; James M. O'Reilly, A Report Prepared for
Shaw v. Hunt 4-5 (Mar. 22, 1994) (submitted as sworn testimony in Shaw v. Hunt, 92-
202-CIV-5-BR (E.D.N.C.)).
111. See O'Reilly, supra note 110, at 5-6.
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the African-American community was still unable to elect a representa-
tive who would support its interests.
In the Democratic primary for that seat, black candidate H.M.
"Mickey" Michaux-a United States Attorney appointed by President
Jimmy Carter-opposed Tim Valentine-a white Democrat, who did not
hesitate to appeal to white voters' racist instincts." 2 In an initial pri-
mary, Michaux finished first among three candidates, with 44.1% of the
racially polarized vote, receiving 88.6% of the black vote but only 13.9%
of the white vote. 1 3 In a runoff between Michaux and Valentine, Valen-
tine emphasized racial themes, warning against "the well organized bloc
vote" and predicting that Michaux "will again be busing his supporters to
the polling places in record numbers." ' 4 In a vote straight along racial
lines, Valentine defeated Michaux by a spread of 6% and went on to win
the general election."' Notably, Michaux received 91.5% of the black
vote but only 13.1% of the white vote." 6 Two years later, in a vote
similarly split along racial lines, black candidate Kenneth Spaulding also
lost the district's primary election to Valentine." 7
As the Michaux race demonstrates, candidates representing African-
American interests and black candidates face an immense barrier in gar-
nering white votes in North Carolina. Due to racial polarization alone,
the prospect of winning 30-40% of the white vote for such candidates is
remote if not inconceivable."' Where Michaux had the support of the
district's 40% black voters, he still failed to garner sufficient white votes
to win.11 9
In the 1980s and 1990s, race-baiting campaigns, marginalizing black
voters, have been commonplace. In 1983, advertising supporting Jesse
Helms' bid for governor against Jim Hunt showed Hunt beside Jesse
Jackson. As one journalist described, "the primary motive is simply to
make the association between Hunt and blacks and to raise fears among
whites that Hunt is a captive of black voters."' 20 Helms also used a mul-
titude of racially oriented signals in his 1990 bid for reelection to the
Senate against an African-American candidate, Harvey Gantt. Gantt
112. See Kousser, supra note 95, at 48.
113. See id. at 49.
114. Watson, supra note 100, at 25-26; see also Kousser, supra note 95, at 50.
115. See Watson, supra note 100, at 26.
116. See Kousser, supra note 95, at 50.
117. See id. at 53-54.
118. See O'Reilly, supra note 110, at 2.
119. Moreover, as J. Morgan Kousser demonstrates, the ability to elect a black repre-
sentative is not merely symbolic. See Kousser, supra note 95, at 20. Black representa-
tives more effectively and consistently present and protect the chosen interests of their
black constituency. See id. at 20-23. This is neither surprising nor disturbing. Due to
their unique history and state-enforced inequality in America, blacks tend to hold atti-
tudes divergent from those of whites on the issues of most import to them, including race
relations, remedies for discrimination, and other areas of civil rights policy. See id. at 24-
27.
120. Watson, supra note 100, at 18.
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had been leading in the polls until the final week of the race when the
Helms campaign ran an advertisement showing a white man's hand
crumpling a job rejection notice, with a voice-over explaining
You needed that job, and you were the best qualified. But they had to
give it to a minority because of a racial quota. Is that really fair? Har-
vey Gantt says it is. Gantt supports Ted Kennedy's racial quota law
that makes the color of your skin more important than your
qualifications. 121
This advertisement galvanized white support for Helms, bringing him
victory. 122
More directly, an anonymous leaflet appeared in rural Columbus
County in 1990, warning voters of "the Negro Vote" and that "more
Negroes will vote in this election than ever before."'2 3 Representative J.
Alex McMillan of the 9th District fanned racial fears with a 1990 fund-
raising letter that warned of "the potential danger of a sophisticated get-
out-the-vote effort among the core Gantt constituency-a constituency
that particularly exists in substantial numbers in the most populous part
of my district, Mecklenburg County."' 124
In the 1992 Presidential campaign, local Republican Party advertise-
ments warned that "[i]f Bill Clinton is elected President, Jesse Jackson
will be a U.S. Senator." '25 And, the Republican Party also engaged in a
massive "postcard campaign," mailing postcards to black voters to dis-
courage them from voting by threatening prosecution against voters who
no longer lived at addresses registered with the Board of Elections. 126
C. North Carolina's Racial Politics Disproportionately
Harm African-Americans
There can be no dispute that race consciousness has been-and contin-
ues to be-central to North Carolina's politics. Racial appeals in cam-
paigns are serious strategic tactics, designed to bring victory, that
minimize the effectiveness of African-American participation in the elec-
toral process. Race consciousness and racial polarization have regularly
marginalized African-American voters-intimidating African-Ameri-
cans from voting; fomenting fear among white voters of candidates who
may forward interests of black citizens; suggesting that black candidates
121. Jamieson, supra note 5, at 97.
122. See id. at 99-100. The "white hands" commercial was not an isolated incident of
the Helms campaign playing to racial fears and animus. The Helms campaign featured
numerous advertisements highlighting Democratic Party Chairman Ron Brown, an Afri-
can-American, as well as advertisements featuring Gantt's black campaign manager. See
Watson, supra note 100, at 20.
123. Watson, supra note 100, at 21.
124. Id. at 26.
125. Id. at 21.
126. See Watt, supra note 13, 8; Affidavit of Charles E. Johnson, 1 8-13 (sworn to
Mar. 18, 1994) (submitted as evidence in Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR
(E.D.N.C.)).
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are unable to protect the interests of all constituents; and perpetuating
animosity and political divisions along racial lines.
Moreover, a mere decade ago the federal courts found that North Car-
olina's dejure exclusion of African-Americans from the voting process-
with, among other means, a poll tax, a literacy test, and a prohibition
against bullet voting' 27 -had contributed to the continued suppression of
African-American participation in North Carolina's political process.' 28
In 1982, there was approximately a 14% disparity between voter regis-
tration of white and black age-qualified citizens-66.7% of whites were
registered as compared with 52.7% of blacks.'29 Although the Court
expressed a hope that continued registration efforts would overcome the
chilling effect of historic discrimination, 30 such efforts have not yet suc-
ceeded. The lingering effects of historic discrimination in voting (as well
as in myriad other facets of civic life) continue to dilute the political
power of African-Americans in North Carolina. 3' In fact, a significant
disparity in voter registration alone-approximately 6.8%-between
whites and blacks still persists, limiting the ability of African-Americans
in North Carolina to assert their political interests. 3 2
The exclusion from North Carolina politics that African-Americans
have suffered has served only to reinforce the legacy of racial segregation
in which many black North Carolinians have lived. For example, black
North Carolinians suffer the harms of poverty, inadequate education and
medical care, infant mortality, unemployment, and violent crime more
acutely than their white counterparts. 3 3 The North Carolina legisla-
ture's 1991 redistricting is not only the first step toward recognizing that
African-Americans disproportionately suffer these ills, but also the first
step toward remedying them.
127. Bullet voting is a practice designed to maximize a group's voting strength in at-
large voting schemes. In at-large districts-where multiple seats are filled in a single
election-voters may cast one vote for as many candidates as there are seats available.
Thus if there are five seats available each voter may cast a vote for any five candidates
running. With bullet voting, voters decline to cast all of their votes-choosing instead to
vote only for their "target" candidate-thereby avoiding the dilution of their vote that
would accompany voting for a full slate. When done in concert, and particularly where
racial bloc voting occurs, bullet voting provides gains to the "target" candidate relative to
other candidates, and therefore increases the likelihood of minority representation.
128. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 359-60 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub
nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 38-39 (1986).
129. See Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 360. In North Carolina, 70.8% of voting-age whites
are registered, while only 64% of voting age blacks are registered. See Jerry T. Jennings,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1992, at
27 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
130. See Gingles, 590 F. Supp. at 361.
131. See Willingham, supra note 97, at 30-31.
132. See Jennings, supra note 129, at 27.
133. See Willingham, supra note 97, at 28-30.
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IV. THE 1991 REDISTRICTING PLAN-A STEP TOWARDS
PLURALISM
In 1991, the North Carolina state legislature formulated the current
redistricting plan. Armed with 1990 census data, the state redistricting
committee implemented the guidelines set forth in the 1982 amendments
to the Voting Rights Act that prohibit the dilution of minority voting
power, both in intent and effect."' In addition, population shifts that
allocated North Carolina an additional representative also altered the
concentration of voters on the county level.' 35 Accordingly, the legisla-
ture redrew the entire face of North Carolina's congressional districts.
In its initial formulation, the redistricting plan included one district of
twelve as a minority-majority district. 136 That district, the First Con-
gressional District, is located in eastern North Carolina, and is largely
rural in character.' 37 The other eleven districts, all drawn to account for,
among other factors, the race and political concerns and party affiliations
of the voters,138 were white-majority districts with varying concentra-
tions of black voters.
Because of North Carolina's history of inhibiting the political partici-
pation of its African-American citizens, forty of its counties are covered
by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, requiring the state to submit all
redistricting plans to the Justice Department for approval.' 39 The Justice
Department objected to the initial plan on the basis that an additional
minority-majority district could be drawn to increase African-American
representation. Although relatively "compact" in shape, the district sug-
gested by the Justice Department lumped together black voters of all
demographic and socio-economic backgrounds-urban and rural, mid-
dle-class and poor, white collar and blue collar. 4 °
Rather than adopt the district suggested by the Justice Department,
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c). The Voting Rights Act was enacted to ensure that the rights
of voters are not abridged due to "race, color, or previous condition of servitude," 42
U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1) (1988), intimidation, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1988), or the devices of
literacy tests and poll taxes, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(C) (1988). The Act falls within the
class of statutes enacted by Congress to remedy the effects of past state discrimination.
See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-64 (1990) (congressional
remedial efforts due particular deference); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472
(1980) (same).
135. See Affidavit of William Hodges, former Chairman of First District Democratic
Party, 1 9 (sworn to Mar. 21, 1994) (submitted as evidence in Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-
CIV-5-BR (E.D.N.C.)); see also Affidavit of Representative Eva M. Clayton, 1 2 (sworn
to Mar. 22, 1994) (submitted as evidence in Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR
(E.D.N.C.)).
136. See Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 463 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v.
Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); Hodges, supra note 135, 1 15.
137. See Hodges, supra note 135, 116; Clayton, supra note 135, 1 2(A).
138. See Hodges, supra note 135, 11 6-8, 12-13, 15-16.
139. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993).
140. This suggested district in the southeastern part of the state was to run from Char-
lotte toward Wilmington along the South Carolina border. It thus included both North
Carolina's largest city and numerous poor, rural areas stretching toward the coast.
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North Carolina legislators reconsidered the entire plan, taking into ac-
count not only the differentiating factors overlooked by the Justice De-
partment, but also the political implications for incumbents. The
resulting additional minority-majority district, the Twelfth District, was
drawn along Interstate Highway 85, linking urban industrial areas across
several counties.'41
Although nominally "minority-majority" districts, the First and
Twelfth Districts-as well as the plan as a whole-are more accurately
characterized as "integrated."' 42 The majority of North Carolina's eligi-
ble black voters do not live in the state's two minority-majority districts.
In fact, less than one-half--only 43%-of North Carolina's eligible black
voters live in these two districts. 143 Most of North Carolina's black vot-
ers-57%-vote in white-majority districts, with 45.8% in the state's six
Democratic, white-majority voting districts and 11.2% relegated to the
four Republican, white-majority districts.' African-American voters
typically represent 18% of the eligible voting strength of the Democratic,
white-majority districts."'
Furthermore, the fact that these districts are "minority-majority" by
no means ensures minority representation, even assuming a viable Afri-
can-American candidate seeks office. Once the voting profile is adjusted
for voter turnout, the black voting strength is only 49.7%,146 and no
candidate can rely on receiving 100% of that voting bloc. In reality, the
lines of the Twelfth District only ensure that its congressional representa-
141. Much has been made of the fact that the Twelfth District follows 1-85, and
crosses several counties. However, as redistricting veteran William Hodges points out,
district lines are often drawn along or up to recognizable landmarks such as rivers or
main streets, and "county-splitting" has been a fact of North Carolina's districting plans
since the 1980s. See Hodges, supra note 135, 9, 10, 14. Moreover, a district's shape is
not the only possible touchstone of legitimacy for a voting scheme. As discussed exten-
sively, supra, the political outlook, economic experience, or common history of voters can
provide an equally compelling, if not more compelling, basis for districting. Indeed, mak-
ing these considerations paramount in districting (and rendering shape of little signifi-
cance) would align the districting process with an effort to identify and give voice to a
wider spectrum of political communities. See Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ.,
686 F. Supp. 1459, 1465-66 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (recognizing that compactness "does not
mean that a proposed district must meet, or attempt to achieve, some aesthetic absolute,
such as symmetry or attractiveness" but rather "that a district is sufficiently geographi.
cally compact if it allows for effective representation").
142. Indeed, when evaluated using two well-accepted measures of population distribu-
tion, these two districts are the most heterogeneous of North Carolina's districts. See
David A. Bositis, Joint Center for Pol. & Econ. Stud., Statistical Measure of Racial Het-
erogeneity, U.S. Congressional Districts of the 103rd Congress, North Carolina (Apr.
1994) (prepared as part of the study, Redistricting and Representation) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
143. See Southern U.S. Congressional Districts by Party and Black Vote, 103rd Con-
gress, First Session, infra app. B.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See North Carolina 12 Voting-Age Population by Race, and by Race and Turn-
out, infra app. D.
19941 1619
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tive-regardless of his or her race-will be more responsive to the needs
of African-American voters than representatives have been in the past.
In a state with the reprehensible history, and continuing practice, of
excluding and marginalizing African-Americans from the political pro-
cess, as detailed above, this achievement is almost embarrassingly mod-
est. Notably, these two districts-from which two African-Americans
were elected to Congress-represent only 16.67% of North Carolina's
congressional delegation, while African-Americans comprise 20.1% of
North Carolina's voting-age citizens. 147 Ten of the twelve districts re-
main white-majority, and, through bloc voting by whites-often en-
couraged by race-baiting campaigns-are represented by white
congressmen. The concerns of the black voters living in those districts
have historically been ignored by the elected representatives, 148 and in
those districts, black voters have little hope of electing more responsive
leaders.
V. THE MISGUIDED PRESUMPTIONS UNDERLYING SHA W v. RENO
In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court failed to focus on the realities of
racial bloc voting and race-baiting campaigns. Instead, they impugned
minority-majority districts, utilizing inexpert, inaccurate, and inappro-
priate analogies.
A. "Political Apartheid"-A Profoundly Flawed Comparison
Since Guinn & Beal v. United States,149 the Supreme Court has devel-
oped a body of understandable and reasonably precise terminology in
construing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and later, in con-
struing the Voting Rights Act. Until its opinion in Shaw, however, the
Supreme Court had never used the term "political apartheid." While
147. See Southern U.S. Congressional Districts by Party and Black Vote, 103rd Con-
gress, First Session, infra app. B.
148. North Carolina Representatives Valentine (D-2nd Dist.) and Hefner (D-8th
Dist.) represent districts with the largest share of African-American voters, 20.1% and
20.9% respectively. See Voting Scores, White Non Hispanic Democratic Congressmen,
Southern States by District Black and Hispanic Voting-Age Populations, 103rd Congress,
First Session, infra app. E. Both have consistently voted with the Conservative Coalition
of Southern Democrats and Republicans, with Conservative Coalition voting support
scores of 76% and 67% respectively. See id. Representative Valentine voted against the
Democratic party for 28% of his votes cast during the first session. See id. In contrast,
during the same period Representatives Clayton and Watt cast only 14% and 7%, re-
spectively, of their votes with the Conservative Coalition. See Voting Scores, CBC Mem-
bers, Southern States by District Black and Hispanic Voting-Age Populations, 103rd
Congress, First Session, infra app. F.
149. 238 U.S. 347 (1915). In Guinn the Supreme Court invalidated an amendment to
the Oklahoma constitution that had restricted suffrage to those who could read and write
the state constitution, or who were descendants of someone entitled to vote in 1866. See
id. at 365. Although the Court only relied on the provisions of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, it found the provision, intended to prevent most blacks from voting while permit-
ting the right of illiterate whites to vote, constitutionally invalid. See id. at 364-65.
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explaining the relevance of an irregularly shaped district's "appearance,"
the majority argued that
[a] reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who
belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in com-
mon with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomforta-
ble resemblance to political apartheid.'5 °
Whenever the Supreme Court uses a new term, scholars ask whether
the term was chosen pursuant to a carefully considered analysis as to its
meanings and implications, or merely in order to add a stylistic flourish
to "liven up" an otherwise drab opinion. We assume that the phrase
"resemblance to political apartheid" was used to convey some significant
insight. In considering North Carolina's redistricting plan, however, the
Court's analogy to political apartheid adds no insight but rather obscures
the issues of whether North Carolina's minority-majority districts are
justified and constitutionally permissible.
The most significant analysis of apartheid written in the last fifteen
years is the report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward
Southern Africa entitled South Africa: Time Running Out.'' That work
notes the words of Professor G.A. Cronjes of the University of Pretoria,
a leading proponent of apartheid, in endorsing that policy:
The racial policy which we as Afrikaners should promote must be di-
rected to the preservation of racial and cultural variety. This is be-
cause it is according to the Will of God, and also because with the
knowledge at our disposal it can be justified on practical grounds....
The more consistently the policy of apartheid could be applied, the
greater would be the security for the purity of our blood and the surer
our unadulterated European racial survival .... Total racial separa-
tion . . . is the most consistent application of the Afrikaner idea of
racial apartheid.15
2
Apartheid required drastic social engineering, which in turn required
political engineering:
[A] Nationalist leader, spelled out the ways in which his government
150. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993) (emphasis added).
151. Study Comm'n on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, South Africa: Time
Running Out (1981) [hereinafter Time Running Out]. This classic treatise has had an
Update Series of books: Pauline H. Baker, The United States and South Africa: The
Reagan Years (1989); John Dugard et al., The Last Years of Apartheid: Civil Liberties in
South Africa (1992); Robert S. Jaster et al., Changing Fortunes: War, Diplomacy, and
Economics in Southern Africa (1992); Tom Lodge et al., All, Here, and Now: Black
Politics in South Africa in the 1980s (1991); Robert Schrire, Adapt or Die: The End of
White Politics in South Africa (1991).
The Commissioners of the study were: Franklin A. Thomas, Chair;, Robert C. Good;
Charles V. Hamilton; Ruth S. Hamilton; Alexander Heard; Aileen C. Hernandez; Con-
stance Hilliard; C. Peter McColough; J. Irwin Miller, Alan Pifer and Howard D.
Samuel.
152. Time Running Out, supra note 151, at 41 (emphasis added) (quoting Professor
G.A. Cronjes of the University of Pretoria).
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would apply apartheid. It would.., abolish the Natives' Representa-
tive Council (which had refused to cooperate with the government)
and the limited indirect African representation that still existed in the
House of Assembly, treat the reserves as the true African homelands,
control the African influx into the cities, protect white workers from
African competition, prohibit African trade unions, and generally seg-
regate whites and blacks as much as possible.
The election took place on May 26, 1948. The results surprised al-
most everyone: Despite obtaining a minority of the popular vote, the
Nationalists and their ally, the small, ephemeral Afrikaner party, won
a working majority in Parliament. The word apartheid would soon
become notorious around the globe.
153
Other commentators similarly describe the far-reaching, invidious na-
ture of apartheid. In his classic treatise, Human Rights and the South
African Legal Order, John Dugard has defined the fundamentals of
apartheid:
Parliamentary supremacy is basic to the constitutional structure of
South Africa. Parliament may make laws on any subject it pleases and
no court of law may enquire into the validity of any act of Parliament
except one which affects the equal language rights....
The twenty-one million black people enjoy no representation in the
central Parliament. Nor are they represented in the Provincial Coun-
cils which have limited legislative powers over the provinces. African
political power is confined to the six homelands, each of which has a
legislative assembly with powers substantially similar to those of the
Provincial Councils. The Colored Persons Representative Council,
which has a very limited law-making capacity, caters for the political
aspirations of the colored people, while a largely advisory body, the
South African Indian Council, constitutes the Indian people's sole
political institution in the body politic.'
54
As Professor Dugard makes clear, this discriminatory political struc-
ture was essential to the perpetuation of the supremacy of South Africa's
white population:
[T]he laws which constitute the foundation of modern South Afri-
can society are discriminatory in the sense in which this term is gener-
ally understood. Some laws, such as the pass laws and the job-
reservation laws, openly discriminate by allocating rights unequally to
blacks. Some, such as the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act and
the Group Areas Act, do not expressly provide for unequal treatment
for blacks but in practice there is no question about their discrimina-
tory effect, which has been acknowledged by the courts. Some, such as
those dealing with education, create separate facilities for blacks that
are either in fact inferior or produce a sense of inferiority among
blacks. Others, such as the race classification laws, the Prohibition of
153. Id. at 41.
154. John Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order 6 (1978) (foot-
notes omitted).
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Mixed Marriages Act, and the Immorality Act, provide for racial sepa-
ration but produce a sense of humiliation among blacks on account of
their professed goal to preserve the "racial purity" of the whites. On
the political front, too, there is discrimination. Even if the homelands
policy is accepted as a genuine, fair political dispensation to Africans
in the homelands, it is difficult to explain the grossly unequal alloca-
tion of land other than in terms of discrimination. As far as Africans
in the common area, coloreds, and Indians are concerned, however,
there is a clear denial of full political rights on account of their race.'
The effect of the laws of apartheid is to "create a sense of inferiority or
humiliation among blacks stemming from their professed aim to promote
the interests of the white group as a primary goal."' s6
Apartheid, as described above, is in no way analogous to minority-
majority redistricting plans in North Carolina-however irregular the
shape of the boundaries. The essence of South African apartheid has
been the exclusion of vast numbers of the population-more than 85%-
from having the right to vote for any representation in Parliament and
the National Government. The first time Dr. Nelson Mandela, like all
other black South Africans, had the opportunity to vote in a national
election of that country was April 26, 1994.'s" "Coloured" and "Indian"
South Africans, permitted to vote in South Africa only recently, were
mandated to choose representatives of their own race to represent them
in separate legislative bodies which could always be overruled by the na-
tional parliament.' 58
In sharp contrast, the minority-majority districts in the United States
foster inclusion into political life; these districts do not exclude any seg-
ment of the population. Instead, race-consciousness is used as a means of
155. Id at 102-03.
156. Id at 103.
157. See Francis X. Clines, After 300 Years, Blacks Vote in South Africa, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 27, 1994, at Al, A8.
158. In the late 1970s, notably after P.W. Botha became prime minister, the National
Party government devised a new constitution that co-opted Coloureds and Indians into
the parliamentary system while enabling the whites to maintain political control. The
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983 enfranchised Coloureds and Indi-
ans-but not Africans-and established a tricameral Parliament consisting of separate
legislative chambers for whites, Coloureds, and Indians. Although this constitution was
heralded by the government as an exercise in democracy, it maintained white domination
of the political system.
The 1983 Constitution established three chambers:
o House of Assembly, with 178 white members elected by whites to represent
some five million whites;
o House of Representatives, with 85 Coloured members elected by Coloureds
to represent three million Coloureds; and
o House of Delegates, with 45 Indian members elected by Indians to represent
nine hundred thousand Indians.
Dugard, supra note 151, at 6. Although provision was made for joint sessions of the three
houses, when adopting legislation, each chamber deliberated separately. In the event of
disagreement, the will of the majority in the white House of Assembly-i.e., the ruling
National Party-prevailed. See id at 5-6.
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enhancing the possibility that African-Americans, who constitute a sig-
nificant percentage of the population, may have responsive representa-
tion and the chance of some members of their race elected to the United
States Congress. 9
In the course of his trial for inciting an illegal strike, Dr. Nelson
Mandela made the following statement about the pervasiveness of
apartheid:
In its proper meaning equality before the law means the right to
participate in the making of the laws by which one is governed, a con-
stitution which guarantees democratic rights to all sections of the pop-
ulation, the right to approach the court for protection or relief in the
case of the violation of rights guaranteed in the constitution, and the
right to take part in the administration of justice as judges, magistrates,
attorneys-general, law advisers and similar positions.
In the absence of these safeguards the phrase "equality before the
law," in so far as it is intended to apply to us, is meaningless and mis-
leading. All the rights and privileges to which I have referred are
monopolised by whites, and we enjoy none of them.
The white man makes all the laws, he drags us before his courts and
accuses us, and he sits in judgement over us.
It is fit and proper to raise the question sharply, what is this rigid
colour-bar in the administration ofjustice? Why is it that in this court-
room I face a white magistrate, am confronted by a white prosecutor,
and escorted into the dock by a white orderly? Can anyone honestly
159. No one has analyzed this issue better than Professor Charles V. Hamilton who
has said:
The macro-historical perspective seems to me to be eminently sound. Looking
at Justice Souter's language of dissent in Shaw v. Reno, and recognizing that
very much will turn around the color-blind/color conscious debate, it is crucial
to put this issue in well-grounded historical context. That is, to indicate pre-
cisely why it is important to take race into account. There are certain 'realities'
of developments over time that should not be overlooked. The courts (in the
earlier white primary cases, the dilatory voter registration practices of southern
boards of registrars, Gomillion v. Lightfoot) have faced these matters head-on
and honestly. When ostensibly race-neutral practices were adopted or district
lines drawn, the courts were not blind to the historical purpose of continuing
racial exclusion.
Today (on the flip side), we should not be blind to the need to take race into
account for the ultimate purpose of inclusion. It is this constitutional intent-
INCLUSION-that remains the goal.
A good macro-historical perspective on the districts involved will illuminate
this argument.
The purpose is not to exclude, but to include. This is the historical journey as
it brings us to present circumstances. It is a route 'political realities' require our
country to take. Neither do we want these to be prescriptions for all time, but
for these evolving times.
Memorandum from Charles V. Hamilton, the Wallace S. Sayre Professor, Columbia Uni-
versity, to the Honorable A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. (Mar. 4, 1994) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review). See also Charles V. Hamilton & Adam C. Powell Jr., The Polit-
ical Biography of an American Dilemma (1991); Charles V. Hamilton, The Bench and
the Ballot: Southern Federal Judges and Black Voters (1973); Charles V. Hamilton, The
Black Experience in American Politics (1973).
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and seriously suggest that in this type of atmosphere the scales of jus-
tice are evenly balanced? 1 '
As Nelson Mandela recognized, political apartheid is the complete ex-
clusion of one race from governance and the domination of that race by
another. Anyone conversant with the origins and development of
apartheid would be shocked with the Supreme Court's suggestion that
the North Carolina plan resembles "political apartheid."' 6' Apartheid in
South Africa is totally dissimilar to the voting rights issues in Shaw v.
Reno.162
B. "Little in Common with One Another But the Color of Their Skin"
Equally disturbing is the premise supporting the Court's political
apartheid analogy-that skin color is, or should be, irrelevant. In sug-
gesting that minority-majority districts bring together those "who may
have little in common with one another but the color of their skin,"' 6 3
the Court implicitly hypothesizes that skin color is not relevant in Amer-
ican politics. That supposition, however, is insupportable in light of this
country's racial history, and the past and current socio-economic condi-
tions afflicting large segments of the African-American population, all of
which uniquely inform African-American politics. Blackness is cultur-
ally and politically relevant. To suggest otherwise is not only naive, but
demeaning.
For African-Americans, there is a commonality in the immutable
characteristic of the "color of their skin.' It is skin color that ratio-
nalized the enslavement of African-Americans, and since emancipation,
race has remained more significant an identifying factor than religion,
region, age, class, or status. The history of race has been more important
to African-Americans than to any other component in this society.
The commonality of the African-American experience has its origins,
of course, in the abducting of Africans for slave labor in the New
World.16 Color was the common denominator in the following adver-
tisement, typical of thousands of advertisements posted in newspapers
and bulletin boards throughout our land:
One hundred and twenty Negroes for sale-The subscriber has just
arrived from Petersburg, Virginia, with one hundred and twenty likely
160. Nelson Mandela, The Struggle is My Life 135 (1990).
161. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993).
162. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
163. Id at 2827.
164. Id
165. Critics of minority-majority districting have challenged the commonality of black
interests, contrasting the experiences and concerns of those African-Americans who are
descendants of American slaves and those emigrating from the West Indies and South
America. See Supreme Court Amicus Brief of American Jewish Congress, Wetherell v.
De Grandy (No. 92-519), at 5-6, 113 S. Ct. 1249 (1993). Of course, in all of the New
World, Africans were kidnapped to serve as slaves and servants to those of European
ancestry.
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young Negroes of both sexes and every description, which he offers for
sale on the most reasonable terms. The lot now on hand consists of
plough-boys, several likely and well-qualified house servants of both
sexes, several women and children, small girls suitable for nurses, and
several small boys without their mothers. Planters and traders are ear-
nestly requested to give the subscriber a call previously to making
purchases elsewhere, as he is enabled to sell as cheap or cheaper than
can be sold by any other person in the trade.
-Hamburg, South Carolina, Benjamin Davis.' 66
Even after slavery was abolished, simply because of "the color of their
skin," 167 blacks were denied all rights of citizenship, the least of which
were rights to participate in the political process. As the tools for the
economic advancement of the white population, blacks were systemically
deprived of fair treatment by the legislatures, executives, and judiciaries
of every level of government from the county-level to the country-
level. 168 In the context of slave codes, criminal codes, and post-Recon-
struction Jim Crow legislation, laws defining the races were enacted to
ensure that anyone who was "black" would-simply because of the color
of his or her skin-be relegated to second-class citizenship.1 69
166. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color: Race and the American
Legal Process, The Colonial Period 12 (1978) (quoting Benjamin Davis advertisement).
Similarly, a New Orleans Bee advertisement noted:
Negroes for sale-a Negro woman, 24 years of age, and her two children, one
eight and the other three years old. Said Negroes will be sold separately or
together, as-desired. The woman is a good seamstress. She will be sold low for
cash, or exchange for groceries. For terms apply to Matthew Bliss and Com-
pany, 1 Front Levee.
Id.
167. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
168. A. Leon Higginbotham has written extensively on this subject. See A. Leon Hig-
ginbotham & Anne F. Jacobs, The "Law Only As An Enemy". The Legitimization of
Racial Powerlessness through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70
N.C. L. Rev. 969 (1992); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "Rather than
the Free". Free Blacks in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
17 (1991); A. Leon Higginbotham, Race, Sex, Education and Missouri Jurisprudence:
Shelley v. Kraemer in a Historical Perspective, 67 Wash. U. L.Q. 673 (1989); A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law
of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 Geo. L.J. 1967 (1989); A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Property First, Humanity Second: The Recognition of the
Slave's Human Nature in Virginia Civil Law, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 511 (1989).
169. See generally John H. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, A History of African-
Americans 236-77 (7th ed. 1994) (discussing the post-Civil War development of "Jim
Crow" laws and "Black Codes"). In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the plain-
tiff, Homer Plessy, who alleged that he was seven-eighths white, asserted that racial seg-
regation by the state was per se unconstitutional and that being considered a white man
was property "which [had] an actual pecuniary value" that could not be taken without
due process of law. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 8, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (No.
210). He stated:
How much would it be worth to a young man entering upon the practice of law
to be regarded as a white man rather than a colored one? Six-sevenths of the
population are white. Nineteen-twentieths of the property of the country is
owned by white people. Ninety-nine hundredths of the business opportunities
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Indeed, dejure segregation was the norm until very recently. 7 ° And,
as the Supreme Court itself has recognized, African-Americans continue
to suffer from the effects of slavery, segregation, and prejudice.' As a
direct result of hundreds of years of oppression, African-Americans are
at the bottom of every socio-economic indicator. For example, according
to information about North Carolina collected by various state and fed-
eral agencies, 61% of black households are classified as low income or
very low income, in comparison to 36% of the white population." 2 In
North Carolina's five major metropolitan areas there are at least four
black children living in poverty for every white child living in poverty
even though blacks are only 21.9% of the state's population.' African-
American mothers are more likely to be "at risk" than white mothers,
and more likely to receive sub-standard health care during pregnancy."74
Large numbers of North Carolina's African-American population are on
public assistance; 175 the unemployment rate for blacks in North Carolina
is disproportionately high;' 76 and the scholastic achievements of blacks
in North Carolina are disproportionately low. '77
In the course of his trial for sabotage and treason, Dr. Nelson Mandela
described the link between socio-economic deprivation and political
empowerment:
are in the control of white people. These propositions are rendered even more
startling by the intensity of feeling which excludes the colored man from the
friendship and companionship of the white man. Probably most white persons
if given a choice, would prefer death to life in the United States as colored per-
sons. Under these conditions, is it possible to conclude that reputation of being
white is not property? Indeed, is it not the most valuable sort of property, being
the master-key that unlocks the golden door of opportunity?
Id. at 9.
170. It is only forty years since the Supreme Court overruled Plessy in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), holding that in the context of public education,
separateness fostered inequality. Statutes requiring segregation in a variety of other con-
texts remained in force for a significant period after Brown was announced.
171. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (Powell, J.) ("No
one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in this country."); see also
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 361-62 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (discussing continuing
effects of discrimination in North Carolina), modified sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
172. See North Carolina Housing Finance Agency, 1994-98 Comprehensive Housing
Affordability Strategy, tbl. IA (1993) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
173. See Children's Defense Fund, Child Poverty Data from 1990 Census (1992) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review).
174. See Kathryn B. Surles et al., North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural
Resources, Special Report: Health Status of Blacks in North Carolina, tbls. 10, 12, 13, 19
(1993) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
175. See North Carolina Div. of Social Servs., AFDC Case Profile Summary, Cases
Active on January 1, 1994 (1994) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); North Carolina
Dep't of Human Resources Food Stamp Info. Sys., Case Information Profile (1993) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review).
176. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment,
1992 (Bulletin #2428), tbl. 12 (1993) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
177. See North Carolina Dep't of Pub. Instruction, The North Carolina 1993 Scholas-
tic Aptitude Test Report 20 (1993) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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Africans want to be paid a living wage•., to perform work which they
are capable of doing, and not work which the government declares
them to be capable of... to be allowed to live where they obtain work
... to be part of the general population, and not confined to living in
their own ghettos .... Africans want to be allowed out after eleven
o'clock at night and not to be confined to their rooms like little chil-
dren ... to be allowed to travel in their own country .... Africans
want a just share in the whole of South Africa; they want security and
a stake in society.
Above all, we want equal political rights, because without them our
disabilities will be permanent.1 78
Even the cultural experience of African-Americans has political signif-
icance. African-Americans share a cultural tradition with roots reaching
back to slavery. Black churches, which during slavery were centers for
illicit learning and part of the network of freedom, nourished the civil
rights movement and continue today as centers of political activism."9
Black music, rooted in the tradition of slave spirituals of freedom, contin-
ues today as a means of communicating political and social ideas. Black
writers, excluded from the white press, created separate newspapers and
magazines, used to call the government to respond to the plague of
lynching, to inform black citizens of significant political events, and to
advertize civil rights activities, traditions which continue today. 8 0 Cul-
turally and politically, it is likely that two African-Americans will have
more in common simply because of the color of their skin than will ran-
dom persons who happen to live within the same compact district.
Ultimately the Supreme Court majority accomplishes what it cautions
the plaintiffs not to do: it confuses the ideal of a color-blind society with
the reality of our race-conscious society.'' The Shaw majority put on
blinders to dream of a world that Langston Hughes once described:
I Dream a World
I dream a world where man
No other will scorn,
Where love will bless the earth
And peace its paths adorn.
I dream a world where all
Will know sweet freedom's way,
Where greed no longer saps the soul
178. Mandela, supra note 160, at 180-81 (emphasis added).
179. Notably, many of the civil rights movement's most influential leaders come from
the tradition of African-American religion: Rev. Martin Luther King, Adam Clayton
Powell Jr., Malcolm X, Rev. Jesse Jackson, and Rev. Al Sharpton are all products of
black religious organizations. See generally Evelyn B. Higginbotham, Righteous Discon-
tent: The Women's Movement in the Black Baptist Church, 1880-1920 (1993) (discuss-
ing role of activists in the Baptist church).
180. Journalist Ida Wells-Barnett regularly published articles chronicling the lynch-
ings plaguing the South and calling for action. See Flexner, supra note 81, at 192-93.
That tradition was continued by Crisis, the magazine of the NAACP.
181. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993).
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Nor avarice blights our day.
A world I dream where black or white,
Whatever race you be,
Will share the bounties of the earth
And every man is free,
Where wretchedness will hang its head,
And joy, like a pearl,
Attend the needs of all mankind.
Of such I dream-
Our world!
18 2
Though Langston Hughes dreamt of a world where race was irrelevant,
he described the contrasting reality of being black in America:
Let America Be America Again
Let America be America again.
Let it be the dream it used to be.
Let it be the pioneer on the plain
Seeking a home where he himself is free.
(America never was America to me.)
Let America be the dream the dreamers dreamed-
Let it be that great strong land of love
Where never kings connive nor tyrants scheme
That any man be crushed by one above.
(It never was America to me.)
0, let my land be a land where Liberty
Is crowned with no false patriotic wreath,
But opportunity is real, and life is free,
Equality is in the air we breathe.
(There's never been equality for me,
Nor freedom in this "homeland of the free.")' 83
On another occasion he wrote:
Merry-Go-Round
Where is the Jim Crow section
On this merry-go-round,
Mister, cause I want to ride?
Down South where I come from
White and colored
Can't sit side by side.
Down South on the train
There's a Jim Crow car.
On the bus we're put in the back -
But there ain't no back
To a merry-go-round!
Where's the horse
For a kid that's black?
184
182. American Negro Poetry 71-72 (Arna Bontemps ed., 1963).
183. Id. at 193.
184. Id at 192.
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For African-Americans in North Carolina, for most of their lives,
there has been no "merry-go-round" to ride in national political life. The
1991 Redistricting Act, which finally made it possible to have a con-
cerned congressman "for a kid that's black," was necessitated by the con-
tinuing race-consciousness in our country and by the bonds of history,
economics, and culture that still inexorably link African-Americans.
In our society, there is racial bloc voting; campaigns focus on civil
rights initiatives, and political ads play on the most blatant stereotypes
and fears surrounding race relations."8 5 We doubt that the immutable
characteristic of skin color will ever become irrelevant to politics. But
even if that ideal is motivating the Shaw majority, to deem irregularly
shaped minority-majority districts subject to strict scrutiny as overly
"race-conscious" is counter-productive. As Justice Blackmun stated in
Bakke, "[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race. There is no other way."' 86 We submit that American society has
not yet reached a moment where African-Americans have "little in com-
mon with one another but the color of their skin."' 87 The Supreme
Court's voting rights law should not be based on a politically appealing
dream that denies all of American history. The law should not distort
that history such that the concept of "color blindness" is used-like a
surgeon's scalpel-to excise African-Americans from significant political
power.
C. "Segregation". . . "Stereotypes". . . "Representative Democracy"
and Federalism
The Supreme Court's majority opinion, with its comments on racial
"segregation," "stereotypes," and "representative democracy" also sug-
gests naivet6 about the history of American race relations and the com-
petence of African-American congresspersons. The majority concludes
that "an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of
their race [violates equal protection if] the separation lacks sufficient jus-
tification."' 88 The Court reasoned:
If our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it
must recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes
retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury .... By
perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the
185. See supra notes 99-133 and accompanying text.
186. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978). Justice Black-
mun continued:
And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We
cannot-we dare not-let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial
supremacy.
Id. See also David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 114
("[W]e do not have a choice between colorblindness and race-consciousness; we only
have a choice between different forms of race-consciousness.").
187. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993).
188. Id. at 2832 (emphasis added).
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very pattern of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is
sometimes said to counteract ....
When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived
common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely
to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the mem-
bers of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. This is
altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy."'
8 9
The Supreme Court majority also suggested the irregular shape of the
Twelfth District was possibly de jure segregation, writing that "a reap-
portionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally
cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 'segregat[e]...
voters' on the basis of race."' 90
The South's long-term oppression of African-Americans required and
sanctioned racial separation and racial discrimination. This segregation
involved, inter alia, denying blacks first-rate public accommodations in
restaurants, hotels, and public facilities. It existed in housing, educa-
tional policies, and employment-in nearly every facet of life. It notori-
ously required black children to attend separate schools, and blacks to
ride in the back of buses, use separate bathrooms, and drink from sepa-
rate water fountains. 19'
Racist segregation, however, is not analogous to a white voter's resi-
dence in a congressional district where a slight majority of the voting
population is African-American. No person residing in either District
One or District Twelve is required to live in those districts; nor is anyone
precluded from moving to any of the other ten congressional districts in
North Carolina. Nor has any person had his or her vote diluted by rea-
son of living in either District One or District Twelve.' 92
189. Id. at 2827 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088
(1991)) (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 2826-27 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960)) (emphasis
added). The majority went on to liken District Twelve to the district at issue in
Gomillion:
Gomillion, in which a tortured municipal boundary line was drawn to exclude
black voters, was such a case. So, too, would be a case in which a State concen-
trated a dispersed minority population in a single district by disregarding tradi-
tional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for
political subdivisions.
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826-27. But as Justice Souter notes, Gomillion is distinguishable
from Shaw in that the Gomillion plaintiffs alleged a constitutional harm-being excluded
from voting within the municipality in which they lived. See id. at 2846 (Souter, I.,
dissenting) ("[R]ace-based discrimination places the disfavored voters at the disadvantage
of exclusion from the franchise.").
191. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387-402 (1978) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
192. As Justice Souter explained:
The majority's use of 'segregation' to describe the effect of districting here may
suggest that it carries effects comparable to school segregation making it subject
to like scrutiny. But a principal consequence of school segregation was inequal-
ity in educational opportunity provided, whereas use of race (or any other
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White voters who live in District One or District Twelve have no fewer
rights than African-Americans living in any of the ten other congres-
sional districts of North Carolina, where the African-American popula-
tion is less than 50%, but in some instances as high as 20%. 193 The use
of the term "segregation" thus reveals a certain naivet6 by the majority of
the Court: as long as African-Americans constitute less than a majority
of a district, the Court suggests, the district is "integrated," but once the
black presence exceeds 50%-however slightly-the district is "segre-
gated."' 94 But it is not rational to equate districts having 53% black
voters with the oppression of racial segregation that America sanctioned
for decades.
D. North Carolina's Integrated Districts Are Neither
Apartheid Nor Segregation
Suggestions that Districts One and Twelve amount to political
apartheid or segregation are poorly reasoned. Apartheid, an official pol-
icy designed to exclude the members of one racial group from participat-
ing in government, is instituted by the promulgation of restrictive
legislation adversely impacting a disenfranchised population.
By contrast, North Carolina's First and Twelfth Districts are not the
black "homelands"-they are not isolated or segregated black ghettos.
They are integrated districts, where African-Americans constitute only
slight majorities and voters are not required to vote for representatives of
a particular race. Indeed, candidates in these districts have as much of a
probability of facing a diverse field of opponents as do candidates in any
of the other ten districts. Once elected, all representatives sit in Con-
gress, not in a separate legislative body, where they vote on a national
legislative agenda. African-American representatives do not speak only
to "black" interests, any more than representatives from Iowa farmlands
speak only to "farming interests" and representatives from New York
City or Chicago speak only to "urban interests." Indeed, Congressman
Watt and Congresswoman Clayton have distinguished themselves with
service in the House for their constituents on a broad range of issues. I"
In this last regard, it is worth remembering that many of the interests
group characteristic) in districting does not without more deny equality of polit-
ical participation.
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2846 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
194. The "tipping phenomenon" has been recognized by many courts and sociologists
as a proven phenomenon, in which white flight is precipitated by the perception by whites
of "over integration," when African-Americans are more than 33% of a neighborhood's
population. See, e.g., Burney v. Housing Auth. of County of Beaver, 551 F. Supp. 746,
766 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (discussing cases and commentaries).
195. In fact, Congresswoman Clayton was not only elected president of the Demo-
cratic freshman class but also was recently voted "most influential newcomer to the Hill."
See Michel Closes on Foley in 'Most Respected, Tally,' Roll Call, Feb. 7, 1994, at 6.
One of the most disturbing aspects of the Court's opinion is its pejorative implications
as to the capabilities of African-American public officials. The Court stressed:
1632 [Vol. 62
19941 RACIAL REDISTRICTING 1633
of particular concern to North Carolina's African-American voters are
shared by the state's whites of similar socio-economic deprivation. High
unemployment and poverty, increased incidents of violent crime and po-
lice brutality, and limited health care resources-although issues that
disproportionately impact the African-American community-are not is-
sues limited to the black community. Indeed, in creating the First and
Twelfth Districts, North Carolina legislators, while preserving the inter-
ests of incumbents and the balance of political power within the state,
created districts that, although awkwardly shaped, gracefully unite a
multi-racial coalition of interests. 96  What is significant then about the
voters of the First and Twelfth districts is that their interests are similar
on many key issues-regardless of race. These districts are not "black"
districts, are not political apartheid, and are not racially segregated. In
fact, the opposite is true.
At a minimum, the First and Twelfth Districts ensure representation
that will fairly effectuate the concerns of African-American and white
voters, without fear of neglect or intimidation. They cause in effect the
When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived com-
mon interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that
their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather
than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical to our system
of representative democracy.
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993) (emphasis added). Mel Watt is a Phi Beta
Kappa graduate of the University of North Carolina and a Yale Law School graduate.
Eva Clayton holds Bachelor's and Master's degrees from Johnson C. Smith University
and North Carolina Central University. Both are able to represent their "constituency as
a whole," certainly as well as the white congressmen who for nine decades, the Supreme
Court apparently assumes, represented their "constituency as a whole." Mel Watt and
Eva Clayton, no doubt, will more steadfastly protect the rights of their white constituents
than did Senators Willis Smith and Jesse Helms protect the rights of their black constitu-
ents. See supra notes 5, 99-107, 120-22 and accompanying text. Unless the Court truly
believes that African-American representatives are inherently less capable than their
white counterparts, it should exercise caution when making suggestions about black rep-
resentatives' abilities "to represent only the members of [their] group." Shaw, 113 S. Ct.
at 2827.
196. District One connects voters in several sparsely populated, largely rural counties.
See Clayton, supra note 135, 2. The district's inhabitants include the state's largest
concentration of small farmers, as well as many small business proprietors, government
and military employees, and employees at several area colleges. The district has a large
proportion of "working poor families." Id. 2.B. Economic development and increased
community services, like health care, housing, and utilities delivery, are issues that unite
the voters of the First District. See id 2.B-C.
Similarly, the Twelfth District brings together voters with common socio-economic
backgrounds and interests. These voters are largely urban and dependent upon an indus-
trial economic base. See Affidavit of Jose F. Alvarez, 4-6, 9-14 (sworn to Mar. 23,
1994) (submitted as evidence in Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR (E.D.N.C.)); Watt,
supra note 13, 18. In addition to shared concerns about labor and foreign trade arising
from the textile industry, which dominates the district, as urban dwellers the voters of
District Twelve share concerns about crime, housing, and community investment. See
generally, Lonni Guanier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Redistricting: A
Case of the Emperor's New Clothes, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1589, 1593 n.18 (1993) (criticizing
Shaw and arguing that North Carolina's African-American constituency is politically
cohesive).
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inclusion of African-Americans in the political process. The presence of
two representatives from North Carolina who are responsive to the con-
cerns of their constituents will go far towards preventing the continued
promulgation of policies that, at best, are insensitive to the plight of Afri-
can-Americans, and, at worst, exacerbate the deteriorating condition of
blacks in America.
VI. PLURALISM IN CONGRESS: A BARRIER TO PERPETUATING
"HISTORIC WHITE SUPREMACY"'
197
In Shaw, the Supreme Court relies on an ideal of democracy that the
United States has yet to, and might never, attain. Wielding this vision,
the Court has created a dynamic that might undermine the recent strides
toward pluralism made in Congress.
A. Defining "Representative Democracy"
In Shaw, the majority speaks of "our system of representative democ-
racy, ' ' 98 resurrecting a view of democracy expressed by Justice Douglas
in his dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller.'99 Under this view, the 1991 re-
districting puts at risk " 'the multiracial, multireligious communities that
our Constitution seeks to weld together as one,' " by "'emphasizing dif-
ferences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitu-
tional sense.' "'I The Court's reliance on Justice Douglas's dissent is
fitting, as he would have invalidated the districting plan that had enabled
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. to return to Congress. Justice Douglas, in the
guise of ensuring that "race... creed or... color" would not be inappro-
priately inteijected into the "democratic ideal,"' 0' would have denied mi-
nority voters an important voice in Congress during the height of the
Civil Rights movement, a time when race, creed, and color were of para-
mount concern to the nation. Those issues still inform American poli-
tics. Accordingly, the Shaw majority's belief in "our system of
representative democracy" is no more realistic than Justice Douglas'
faith in a democratic ideal in which "the individual['s] ... race, his creed
or his color" is not important.
What does the Shaw majority envision when it speaks of "our system
of representative democracy"? Was our system a "representative democ-
racy" when the Supreme Court declared in Dred Scott that a black man
"had no rights which the white man was bound to respect"?20 2 Was our
system a representative democracy from 1901 to 1927 when there were
no African-Americans in the United States House of Representatives, or
197. Franklin, supra note 169, at 259.
198. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
199. 376 U.S. 52, 59 (1964).
200. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66-67
(1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
201. Wright, 376 U.S. at 66-67 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
202. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
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from 1929 to 1944, when there was only one African-American voice in
Congress? 2 3 The voice of that one representative, Congressman Arthur
Mitchell, was all but drowned out by the antagonistic posturing of his
white colleagues. During the 1936 Democratic convention, for example,
his own party rejected his participation in the electoral process: "Con-
gressman Mitchell's presence on the podium... was used as an excuse
for a U.S. senator from South Carolina and eight other delegates to stage
a walkout in protest. But even that demonstration was mild compared to
what had happened in previous conventions ....
In fact, Congressman Mitchell was a second class citizen to Congress,
his party, and his country. On April 30, 1937, he boarded a Pullman car
in Chicago with a first class ticket to Hot Springs, Arkansas. When the
conductor told him that he could no longer ride in the first class section
(the train had crossed state lines), Mitchell, as he later testified, "thought
it might do some good for me to tell him who I was."' 2 5 After he identi-
fied himself as a United States Congressman, according to Mitchell, the
conductor said "it didn't make a damn bit of difference who I was, that
as long as I was a nigger I couldn't ride in that car., 20 6 Mitchell testified:
[F]or a moment I decided that I wouldn't go, that I would let them
put me in jail down there and see how the thing would finally come
out.
But I happened to think that I was in Arkansas, and sometimes they
don't keep them in jail for trial down there, but they take them out and
lynch them after they put them in jail; so I thought maybe I had better
not; being the only negro in Congress, that I had better not be lynched
on that trip.
20 7
Mitchell retreated to the decrepit black coach.20 8
Was our system a representative democracy when from 1945 to 1955
203. See African-Americans in the U.S. Congress, 1870-1993, infra app. A.
204. William L. Clay, Just Permanent Interests: Black Americans in Congress 1870-
1991, at 72 (1992).
205. Record from the United States Supreme Court, Mitchell v. United States Inter-
state Commerce Comm'n, 313 U.S. 80 (1941) (No. 577), at 79 (reprinting the testimony
of Arthur W. Mitchell before the Interstate Commerce Comm'n, Mitchell v. Chicago,
R.I. & Pac. Ry., 229 I.C.C. 703 (1938) (No. 27844)), quoted in A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr. & William C. Smith, The Hughes Court and The Beginning of The End of The "Sepa-
rate but Equal" Doctrine, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1099, 1103 (1992).
206. Higginbotham, supra note 205, at 1103 (testimony of Arthur W. Mitchell).
207. Id at 1103-04 (testimony of Arthur W. Mitchell).
208. See id "The conductor's behavior was in clear violation of a 1914 Supreme Court
ruling that the denial of first class accommodations on trains to blacks violated the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id at 1103; see McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151,
161-62 (1914). "In 1941, the Supreme Court declared that the railroad's treatment of
Mitchell violated his rights under the Interstate Commerce Act." Higginbotham, supra
note 205, at 1103; see Mitchell v. United States Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 313 U.S.
80, 97 (1941). The Mitchell Court concluded that "the discrimination shown was palpa-
bly unjust and forbidden by the [Interstate Commerce] Act." Mitchell, 313 U.S. at 97.
Mitchell eventually received $1,250 in settlement. See Higginbotham, supra note 205, at
1103.
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there were only two African-Americans in the United States Congress? 20 9
The feelings of helplessness many African-Americans experienced in
these decades was expressed poignantly by Richard Wright in his intro-
duction to the classic sociological treatise, Black Metropolis.21" Wright
wrote:
[I]n the 1920's, when racial hate was at a hysterical pitch, and after the
grinding processes of history had forged iron in the Negro's heart, we
hear a new and strange cry from another Negro, Claude McKay. In
his sonnet, If We Must Die, he seems to snarl through a sob:
If we must die-let it not be like hogs
Hunted and penned in an inglorious spot,
While round us bark the mad and hungry dogs,
Making their mock at our accursed lot.
If we must die-oh, let us nobly die,
So that our precious blood may not be shed
In vain; then even the monsters we defy
Shall be constrained to honor us though dead!
Oh, kinsmen! We must meet the common foe;
Though far outnumbered, let us still be brave,
And for their thousand blows deal one death-blowl
What though before us lies the open grave?
Like men we'll face the murderous, cowardly pack
Pressed to the wall, dying, but-fighting back!
What has America done to people who could sing out in limpid
verse to make them snarl about being 'pressed to the wall' and dealing
'one death-blow?' Is this the result of a three-hundred-year policy of
'knowing niggers and what's good for 'em?' Is this the salvation which
Christian missionaries have brought to the 'heathen from Africa?'
That there is something wrong here only fools would deny.
White America has reduced Negro life in our great cities to a level of
experience of so crude and brutal a quality that one could say of it in
the words of Vachel Lindsay's The Leaden-Eyed that:
It is not that they starve, but they starve so dreamlessly,
It is not that they sow, but that they seldom reap,
It is not that they serve, but they have no gods to serve,
It is not that they die, but that they die like sheep.2 1
The presence of two African-Americans in Congress contributed little
towards efforts to shed the African-American community of its outsider
status. Even in 1957, when four of 545 members of Congress were Afri-
can-Americans, did not the significant lack of racial pluralism in Con-
gress signify that America was not a representative democracy? 212
During that period, congressmen from the South almost uniformly
joined the Southern Manifesto expressing in chorus resistance to Brown
209. See Congressional Representation (House and Senate), 1871-1993, infra app. C.
210. St. Clair Drake & Horace R. Clayton, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life
in a Northern City at xxxiii-xxxiv (1945) (introduction by Richard Wright).
211. Id.
212. See African-Americans in the U.S. Congress, 1870-1993, infra app. A.
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and its anti-segregation signal."1 3
In 1965, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., a representative of Congress (de-
spite Justice Douglas' opposition in Wright), and three other sitting black
congressmen, voted in support of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.2 4 As a
direct result of that Act, African-American voters were no longer barred
from the polls, and the number of African-American representatives be-
gan to increase. The input of these representatives, who have included
John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich. 1965-present), William L. Clay (D-Mo.
1969-present), Shirley Chisholm (D-NY 1969-82), Charles Rangel (D-
NY 1970-present), Ron Dellums (D-Ca. 1971-present), Barbara Jordan
(D-Tx. 1973-78), and Andrew Young (D-Ga. 1973-77), among others,
has been influential in focusing at least some attention on issues of impor-
tance to African-Americans.
Yet, these voices did not begin to make the Congress "look like
America" until recent elections, which brought the tally of members of
the Congressional Black Caucus to forty. 15
These new congresspersons finally have the possibility of insuring that
issues of African-American concern are brought before the Congress.
For example, because of the influence of African-American voters in
North Carolina's minority-majority districts, their representatives are re-
sponsive to issues of special concern to all black North Carolinians. As
long as these districts remain minority-majority black, it is likely that the
interests of the historically black colleges will be aggressively ad-
dressed,216 and that redlining practices of banks affecting black neighbor-
hoods will be closely scrutinized.21 Funding for Head Start programs
will be vigorously pursued, and cutbacks to social services will be chal-
lenged by representatives ready to dispute the stereotypes of lazy black
men and "welfare mothers." Furthermore, unlike some of their prede-
cessors who attempted to thwart the interests of African-American vot-
ers, these representatives can support civil rights initiatives without fear
that taking a principled stand will end their political careers.
But the importance of a pluralistic Congress is not only bringing "Af-
rican-American" issues to the fore; a pluralistic Congress, perhaps more
importantly, also nurtures a truer representative democracy. A Congress
with members of all colors brings more American citizens into the polit-
ical system, as it announces that government is for all Americans, in-
creases the confidence of all American voters in the government, and
213. Nineteen senators and 83 representatives from the South joined the Manifesto.
See Norman Dorsen et al., 2 Political and Civil Rights in the United States 700 n.2 (4th
ed. 1979).
214. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (1965).
215. See African-Americans in the U.S. Congress, 1870-1993, infra app. A.
216. See Affidavit of Dr. Robert Albright, 7-8 (sworn to Mar. 19, 1994) (submitted
in Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR (E.D.N.C.)).
217. See Affidavit of J.C. Harris, 7-8 (sworn to Mar. 23, 1994) (submitted in Shaw
v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR (E.D.N.C.)).
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thereby cultivates political participation of all Americans.2 8
Thus, the challenge in these present voting rights cases is whether the
significant racial pluralism finally occurring in the United States Con-
gress will prevail-whether the voices and interests of minorities and,
indeed, all Americans will be welcomed in the public debate-or whether
the voices of minorities again will be silenced.
B. The Problems of an Unrepresentative Congress
Some people might ask what is wrong in having an unrepresentative
Congress. They may prefer boundary lines that are compact and neatly
drawn at the expense of racial pluralism in Congress. Minimizing plural-
ism in Congress, however, comes at a high cost: the confidence of large
segments of the population in the government is undermined and the
insight of the body is significantly limited. Those groups that are the
most tolerant of an unrepresentative Congress, we believe, are composed
primarily of individuals who have been the major beneficiaries of a con-
gressional system that is not pluralistic in its composition. 2'9 They are
content with the system as long as their "group" enjoys a more advanta-
geous position than it would were the Congress more representative of
the population. However, the adverse impact of an unrepresentative
Congress on both the public's perception of the Congress and the Con-
gress' perception of the public is significant.
The Armed Services, which are disproportionately black and poor,
provide a palpable example of the necessity that all Americans have con-
fidence in a government that they perceive to be representative, particu-
larly when that government makes decisions impacting that group. As
was noted in The New York Times during the Gulf War:
Close to 30 percent of the Army's troops in Operation Desert Storm
are black, though blacks are just 14 percent of the nation's population
between the ages of 18 and 24. In a land war, black casualties will be
similarly disproportionate. Is it fair? Is it inevitable? For answers,
one must search the soul of American society.220
The decision to commit forces to combat bears much less legitimacy
when the legislative body acting in support of that decision does not well
represent soldiers sent to combat, in other words, when Congress is not
pluralistic. 221
218. For a thoughtful review of these and other issues, see Kathryn Abrams, Raising
Politics Up: Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 449 (1988).
219. As an example, in a somewhat different context, most Americans seemed oblivi-
ous or indifferent to the fact that until October 1992, Presidents Reagan and Bush be-
tween them had appointed 115 court of appeals judges, only two of whom were African-
American. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Case of the Missing Black Judges, N.Y.
Times, July 29, 1992, at A21.
220. The Killing Fields Aren't Level, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1991, at A2.
221. The fears of African-American servicemen and women and their families were
surely lessened by the participation of General Colin Powell, America's first African-
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Further, in the context of the Gulf War, the value of a pluralistic body
deciding whether to send soldiers into combat was particularly acute.
Public opinion was sharply divided on race (and gender) lines. In fact,
although most black voters supported the war effort, twice as many
blacks as whites-39% vs. 19%-thought President Bush should have
given sanctions more time to work.222
Some persons might argue that it is possible to have a viable, fair, and
effective congressional system even when there is no significant correla-
tion between the composition of the Congress and the nation's popula-
tion. Nevertheless, we submit that it is difficult to have a Congress that
in the long run has the respect of most segments of the public unless it
has significant pluralistic strands in its composition. Although the values
held by each individual congressperson are important, and although
mere pluralism does not guarantee an effective Congress, pluralism is
nevertheless an important virtue, a sine qua non to building a Congress
that is both substantively excellent and also respected by the general pop-
ulation. A pluralistic Congress brings a variety of backgrounds and ex-
periences to pressing issues of social policies, which demand innovation
to solve. More often than not, congressional homogeneity and exclusiv-
ity are deterrents to, rather than promoters of, such innovation.22 In
contrast, a pluralistic Congress raises the likelihood that that body will
identify the concerns of all Americans. As was recently demonstrated in
the debate over whether to retire at full rank the Navy's top admiral-
who commanded that organization at the time of the infamous
"Tailhook Scandal"-the presence of women in the Senate stirred un-
precedented soul searching and insight on that gender-related issue." 4
American Joint Chief of Staff, in the command decision-making process. General Pow-
ell's sentiment that the soldiers fighting in the Gulf "were family ... [no matter] what
color they were, where they came from, whether they were rich or poor" was a poignant
statement, a marked departure from prior commanders of an institution which had per-
petuated segregation in its ranks. African Americans: Voices of Triumph-Perseverance
177 (Time Life Books ed., 1993).
222. Suzanne Alexander et al., Guns v Butter Many Blacks Oppose America's Role in
War Citing Domestic Needs, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1991, at Al, A7.
While some successful black businessmen support the war, for instance, others
oppose it. Thomas Hightower, a businessman in Burbank, Calif., says, 'It's not
about civil rights, but about oil. And look who's at the heart of the decision-
making process: wealthy white males who are sending minorities to their
death.'
Id
223. The essence of pluralism in Congress is the influence of myriad individual exper-
iences. As Justice Benjamin Cardozo has advised us with respect to judges:
We do not pick our rules of law full-blossomed from the trees. Every judge
[and congressperson] consulting his own experience must be conscious of times
when a free exercise of will, directed of set purpose to the furtherance of the
common good, determined the form and tendency of a rule which at that mo-
ment took its origin in one creative act.
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 103.04 (1921) (emphasis
added).
224. See Maureen Dowd, Senate Approves a 4-Star Rank for Admiral in Tailhook Af-
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Professor Charles Warren categorized the problem, with respect to
courts, this way:
The Court is not an organism dissociated from the conditions and his-
tory of the times in which it exists. It does not formulate and deliver
its opinions in a legal vacuum. Its Judges are not abstract and imper-
sonal oracles, but are men whose views are necessarily, though by no
conscious intent, affected by inheritance, education and environment
and by the impact of history past and present.225
Warren's analysis is equally applicable to a legislature and its mem-
bers. A vastly unrepresentative legislature may articulate precepts or
laws that seem appropriate to its members, who never imagine that their
views may be nothing more than the "prejudices" they "share with [some
of] their fellow-men. "226 The American experience is replete with exam-
ples of such legislative biases.227
The courts provide a provocative example of the problems of unrecog-
nized prejudices. On a homogeneous court, no "outsider" challenges the
biases the dominant group accepts as "self-evident" truths. As Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman on the U.S. Supreme Court, has
fair: 54-43 Vote Follows Heated Debate on Floor, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1994, at A 1, B 10.
As was reported:
[A]ll seven women in the Senate joined in trying to stop Admiral Kelso, the
Chief of Naval Operations from retiring at four-star rank.... The women in the
Senate were angrily opposed in the debate by other Senators from both sides of
the aisle .... There were vivid signs in the chamber of women's progress....
But the women in the chamber clearly felt more progress was needed.
Id. We need not spend much time wondering whether the result of that debate would
have differed had women been closer to their 50% proportionate share of Senate mem-
bers rather than merely 7%.
225. 1 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 2 (1926).
226. Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881) ("[E]ven the prejudices whichjudges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed.") As Professor David A.
Strauss has noted:
If a person is prejudiced against black people, his prejudice will manifest itself
whenever he deals with a black person. It follows that if a legislator is
prejudiced, his prejudice will manifest itself whenever he votes on legislation
affecting black people, at least so long as he knows it affects them. If, for exam-
ple, he has-as one theory holds-a tendency to be insufficiently sympathetic to
the burdens placed on blacks, this tendency will manifest itself whenever legisla-
tion places burdens on blacks. Whether the explicit terms of the legislation
happen to mention blacks is immaterial.
David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 121.
227. The Congressional Quarterly, describing the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act, detailed twelve critical civil rights initiatives defeated in Congress, including two
anti-lynching statutes, five initiatives addressing poll taxes and literacy tests, three bills
concerning fair employment practices, and two Civil Rights Acts. See Cong. Q. Almanac
551 (1965). Similarly, gender prejudice influenced Congress and state legislatures, which
in 1871 incorporated gender in the Fifteenth Amendment to ensure women did not gain
suffrage. See Flexner, supra note 81, at 152 (discussing greater support for black suffrage
than for female suffrage). Sexist attitudes successfully thwarted efforts to incorporate
women into the electorate until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.
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recently written of Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first black on the
Supreme Court:
At oral arguments and conference meetings, in opinions and dissents,
Justice Marshall imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life
experiences, pushing and prodding us to respond not only to the per-
suasiveness of legal argument but also to the power of moral truth.228
Justice O'Connor concluded that the stories of such outsiders "made
clear what legal briefs often obscure: the impact of legal rules on human
lives.
229
Pluralism allows a mutual education process between individuals. Mi-
norities learn of the concerns and fears of majorities, while majorities
learn of the lives of others and experiences that they may well be unable
to imagine. The sharing of such life experience is indisputedly necessary
if American democracy is to thrive.
We do not want to be misunderstood. Pluralism does not mean that
only a person of one race will be able to legislate a matter fairly when his
or her race is involved. Pluralism is not grounded on the premise that a
person of a specific race, religion, ethnic background, gender, or region is
able to decide an issue more appropriately than a person of another race,
religion, ethnic background, gender, or region.23° Instead, we are sug-
gesting that pluralism guards against the influences of individual preju-
dice,23! and further creates a milieu in which the entire congressional
system benefits from the multi-faceted experiences of its members. A
pluralistic Congress insures that the public does not perceive the legisla-
ture as having a vested interest in the preservation of the status quo, and
all Americans, whether victims of discrimination or not, can believe that
228. Sandra D. O'Connor, The Story Behind the Storyteller Thurgood Marshall, Phila.
Inquirer, July 5, 1992, at E7 [hereinafter O'Connor, Story]; see also Sandra D. O'Connor,
Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1217, 1217 (1992)
[hereinafter O'Connor, Influence].
229. O'Connor, Story, supra note 228, at E7.
230. Similarly, we are not suggesting that all persons of the same racial, religious, or
ethnic background share a monolithic view of every issue. There is almost as much dif-
ference between the views of Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first African-American to
serve on the U.S. Supreme Court, and Justice Clarence Thomas, the second African-
American to hold that honor, as there is between what mathematicians would call the
difference between infinity and zero. Justice Thomas's views, in fact, are antithetical to
those of most African-Americans. See Race-ing Justice, En-Gendering Power: Essays on
Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas; and the Construction of Social Reality (Toni Morrison ed.,
1992).
231. As is detailed in one article, newly appointed Justice Ginsburg experienced the
effects of discriminatory practices based on her ethnicity and gender. See Elizabeth E.
Gillman & Joseph M. Micheletti, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 3 Seton Hall Const. Li.
657, 657 (1993). When a Harvard student, she was considered a usurper of a seat more
appropriately filled by a male, and in every class she was forced to prove her worth.
Although a top student, she was refused work by New York law firms, who feared as a
wife and mother she would not be able to devote her "full mind and time to a law job."
Id. at 658. The New York law firms of today, now reflecting the influence of capable
women associates and partners, would consider carefully before rejecting such an able
graduate on the basis of outmoded "mommy" stereotypes.
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the legislature is foremost concerned with advancing the good of the
nation.
C. Racial Pluralism and Leverage in Congress
The number of African-Americans in the United States Congress be-
came truly significant when their number rose from 26 in 1991 to 40 in
1993. Yet Shaw v. Reno and its progeny have challenged this progress.
These lawsuits threaten to reduce the number of African-Americans in
Congress by thirty percent, and once again, to diminish the political im-
pact of black citizens.
Pluralism serves more than merely an educational function-it also
has a leveraging factor and determines the scope of political influence, as
Dr. David Bositis suggests:
If all diversity of experience brings to the Congress are other voices
and anecdotes that the traditional membership might sample and con-
sider in their deliberations, that is not enough. Political leverage re-
quires [that] those traditional members-typically white middle class
males-must seriously regard those new representatives as full part-
ners, and as in the past (principally in dealing with their white peers),
fear the repercussions that come with overlooking the just and reason-
able demands of these new and different members. 232
A manifestation of leveraging has already occurred. The House Dem-
ocratic Caucus met on July 11, 1993 to consider disciplining eleven Dem-
ocratic subcommittee chairmen, who voted against President Clinton's
budget. This meeting was summoned at the behest of eighty-one Demo-
cratic members, a majority of whom were minority group members and
women. While no action was taken against these chairmen, this is the
first time such an attempt was made, and further, it clearly signaled the
new influence of the expanded Black and Hispanic caucuses.233
In the 103rd United States Congress there are twenty-two standing
House committees.2 34 Except for the Committee on Natural Resources,
there is at least one African-American on each committee.235 If the
freshman congressmen of 1993 return in substantial numbers, with their
seniority increasing, African-American congressmen will be a formidable
group in assisting to shape the federal government's national policies. It
is that breadth of power that Shaw v. Reno threatens.
232. Memorandum from Dr. David A. Bositis, April 20, 1994, to A. Leon Higginbot-
ham, Jr. (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
233. See id.
234. Agriculture; Appropriations; Armed Services; Banking, Finance and Urban Af-
fairs; Budget; District of Columbia; Education and Labor; Energy and Commerce; For-
eign Affairs; Government Operations; House Administration; Judiciary; Merchant
Marine and Fisheries; Natural Resources; Post Office and Civil Service; Public Works
and Transportation; Rules; Science, Space and Technology; Small Business; Standards of
Official Conduct; Veterans Affairs; Ways and Means.
235. See Bositis, supra note 57, at 6 & tbl. 8.
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The 1969 report of the National Commission on the Causes and Pre-
vention of Violence warned the nation:
When in man's long history other great civilizations fell, it was less
often from external assault than from internal decay. Our own civili-
zation has shown a remarkable capacity for responding to crises and
for emerging to higher pinnacles of power and achievement. But our
most serious challenges to date have been external-the kind this
strong and resourceful country could unite against. While serious ex-
ternal dangers remain, the graver threats today are internal: haphaz-
ard urbanization, racial discrimination, disfiguring of the environment,
unprecedented interdependence, the dislocation of human identity and
motivation created by an affluent society-all resulting in a rising tide
of individual and group violence.
The greatness and durability of most civilizations has been finally
determined by how they have responded to these challenges from
within. Ours will be no exception. 236
The challenge to America is to solve our problems from within-in the
legislative halls, in the courts, and in government, rather than to allow
increased deterioration from within so that the rule of law becomes less
relevant because the weak, the poor, and the dispossessed feel they have
no advocates pleading their cause. We cannot close our eyes to crisis in
American society today. When there is no dilution of the white vote, the
Supreme Court should not preclude states from working toward signifi-
cant minority representation, as a means of solving problems in
legislatures.2 37
CONCLUSION
Ninety-eight years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided
Plessy v. Ferguson,238 triggering the legitimization of racism and retard-
ing racial progress for almost a century. Last year, Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Souter said "we think Plessy was wrong the day it was
decided. '2 39  Other justices, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, have
236. National Comm'n on the Causes & Prevention of Violence, To Establish Justice,
To Insure Domestic Tranquility, at xxxii (1969).
237. As Justice O'Connor has noted:
[S]tate innovation is no judicial myth. When Wyoming became a State in 1890,
it was the only State permitting women to vote. That novel idea did not bear
national fruit for another thirty years. Wisconsin pioneered unemployment in-
surance, while Massachusetts initiated minimum wage laws for women and mi-
nors. After decades of academic debate, state experimentation finally provided
an opportunity to observe no-fault automobile insurance in operation. Even in
the field of environmental protection, an area subject to heavy federal regula-
tion, the States have supplemented national standards with innovative and far-
reaching statutes.
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
238. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
239. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2813 (1992).
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agreed.24 We feel strongly that Shaw v. Reno also "was wrong the day it
was decided" and hope that the Court will correct this error and not
perpetuate a questionable and newly-imposed legal standard24' that one
district court already has used to invalidate a congressional districting
plan.242 Absent a change in direction, as other courts struggle with ap-
plying strict scrutiny to legislative districting plans, Shaw, like Plessy
before it, may have devastating racial consequences.
Shaw is fundamentally flawed. The decision, at least in part, is pre-
mised on the notion that irregularly shaped, minority-majority congres-
sional districts are somehow akin to apartheid and segregation. But
apartheid and segregation are invidious policies intended, at bottom, to
exclude citizens from civic life because of their race. Minority-majority
districts, intended to include racial minorities into the politics from
which they were for so long locked out, are neither similar nor analogous
to apartheid or segregation. Shaw's misguided suggestion otherwise lim-
its the legitimacy of that decision.
Yet, even under the strict scrutiny required by Shaw, we believe-in
light of the peculiar history of the southern states where challenges to
minority-majority districts are pending-that race-conscious redistrict-
ing used to insure the fair representation of African-Americans will meet
the burdens of that standard. As the North Carolina experience well
demonstrates, only such districting (or other effective means of empower-
ing African-American voters) will unravel the burdens of history and
nurture the experiment of a pluralistic democracy.
Until 1992, with respect to the United States Congress, North Caro-
lina implemented for ninety years the wishes of its former governors to
take the "negro . . . out of politics" ' 243 and to assure "that white govern-
ment shall be supreme and unchallenged in [North Carolina's] bor-
ders."'24  When stripped to its essence, the fundamental issue in the
current North Carolina voting case, as well as in similar cases in other
states, is whether whites and blacks will share in political power. Either
North Carolina-and our nation-will revert to politics akin to the for-
mer "historic white supremacy, ' 245 where African-Americans were a rel-
atively minuscule power in shaping and directing the policies of our
government, or North Carolina will now-though belatedly-fulfill the
vision expressed by Martin Luther King thirty-five years ago when he
said:
240. See supra note 53.
241. As Justice White noted in Shaw, the Court's opinion that the redistricting plan
"might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure
from settled equal protection principles." Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2834 (1993)
(White, J., dissenting).
242. See Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993).
243. Supra note 2.
244. Supra note 3.
245. Franklin, supra note 169, at 259.
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Give us the ballot and we will no longer have to worry the federal
government about our basic rights.
Give us the ballot and we will no longer plead to the federal govern-
ment for passage of an antilynching law; we will by the power of our
vote write the law on the statute books of the southern states and bring
an end to the dastardly acts of the hooded perpetrators of violence.
Give us the ballot and we will transform the salient misdeeds of
bloodthirsty mobs into the calculated good deeds of orderly citizens.
Give us the ballot and we will fill our legislative halls with men of
good will ....
Give us the ballot and we will place judges on the benches of the
South who will 'do justly and love mercy' ....
Give us the ballot and we will quietly and nonviolently, without ran-
cor or bitterness, implement the Supreme Court's decision of May 17,
1954.246
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno, applying the
Equal Protection Clause to preclude African-Americans from attaining
significant political power in this nation, turns the intent and meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment on its head.24 7 In the 1873 case first con-
struing the Fourteenth Amendment, the Slaughter-house Cases,248 the
Supreme Court declared:
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too
recent to be called history, but which are familiar to us all; and on the
most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no one
can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them
all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them
would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave
race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the pro-
tection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of
those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is
true that only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro
by speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is just as true that each
of the other articles was addressed to the grievances of that race, and
designed to remedy them as the fifteenth....
246. Martin L. King, Jr., Give Us the Ballot-We Will Transform the South, Address
to the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom, Washington, D.C. (May 17, 1957), in A Testa-
ment of Hope, The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. 197, 197-98 (James M.
Washington ed., 1986).
247. The only African-American scholar that we know who supports the majority's
opinion is Carol Swain. In our opinion, her argument is flawed, and we agree with Pro-
fessor Randall Kennedy's insightful analysis of her work. See Randall Kennedy, Blacks
in Congress: Carol Swain's Critique, 2 Reconstruction, No. 2, at 34 (1993). Cf. Guanier.
supra note 196 (generally critiquing minority-majority districts).
Of the disheartening factors in Shaw v. Reno, none is more so than the decisive vote of
Justice Clarence Thomas-who succeeded Thurgood Marshall-in favor of the 5-4 deci-
sion. It is inconceivable that Justice Thurgood Marshall would have so interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment, risking a significant set-back to African-Americans' recent
political progress.
248. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by
way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of
their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provi-
sion. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that
a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.
249
Now, 120 years after the Slaughter-house Cases, the Fourteenth
Amendment may be used to thwart rather than to assure effective use of
the ballot by African-Americans. Now, ninety years after George White
was driven from Congress, the Fourteenth Amendment may be used to
undermine rather than to guarantee the racial pluralism that has been
occurring in the Congress.
But, with respect to North Carolina, the history of state-imposed and
state-condoned exclusion of African-Americans from meaningful partici-
pation in the political process is compelling justification for the creation
of the two minority-majority congressional districts included in the 1991
redistricting, and the 1991 redistricting is narrowly tailored to meet that
interest. The redistricting creates only two minority-majority districts
that still provide African-Americans less than proportional representa-
tion. Further, these two districts are well-integrated-whites comprise
just less than half of the voting-age citizens in each; they pool together
individuals with similar political interests; they do not simply band to-
gether voters based on the color of their skin; and, only 43% of North
Carolina's African-American citizens reside in these districts.
North Carolina's two minority-majority districts have brought to Con-
gress two African-American legislators of particular acumen and experi-
ence, who are quite capable of representing all of their constituents. At
the time of Reconstruction, racists distorted the truth to impugn the in-
telligence of African-American members of Congress. Today, the record
establishes that the African-American representatives in Congress are
every bit as talented and more diverse than their white peers,250 as well as
similarly committed to making the United States a land of freedom and
basic justice.
The bizarreness in this case thus is not the shape of the district bound-
aries but rather the challenge itself, where the white vote is not diluted
and where talented legislators represent the districts. 25 I These cases
249. Id. at 71.
250. Of the 40 members of the Congressional Black Caucus, 10 are women. See Afri-
can-Americans in the U.S. Congress, 1870-1993, infra app. A. A comparison of educa-
tion levels of African-American and white members of Congress reveals that African-
American members essentially match the accomplishments of their white peers. Nearly
all have completed secondary education and over 60% have completed post-graduate
degrees. See Bositis, supra note 57, at 4 & tbl. 4; Educational Background of CBC Mem-
bers, 103rd Congress, infra app. G.
251. John Hope Franklin recently noted:
It is curious, but characteristic I fear, that as the new apportionment of 1991
made it possible for more African Americans to gain seats in Congress in 1992,
opposition to those gains would go all the way to the Supreme Court. Justice
O'Connor called the 12th North Carolina Congressional District "bizarre" in
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strike at the heart of race relations in America. While white America
apparently approves of African-Americans serving in entertainment
roles, such as basketball players Michael Jordan at the University of
North Carolina and Grant Hill at Duke, anxiety appears to rise when
avenues open for African-Americans to attain significant political power
and to determine the public policy rather than the entertainment policy
of this nation.
Shaw v. Reno notwithstanding, African-Americans have a right to full
participation in American politics and a right to be heard in determining
the public policy of the nation. Full participation includes the right to
have African-American interests articulated, protected, and advanced in
Congress. Minority-majority districting-like that of North Carolina-
not only is one successful means of insuring these rights but also provides
pluralism to Congress, a body instituted to serve all Americans. Encour-
aging pluralism in Congress, in turn, is a starting point toward bringing
American politics a step closer to that democratic ideal.
shape. Perhaps it is, but not merely because blacks live along 1-85. It is also
because industrial and urban developments trace that same route. Thus, it has
a homogeneity that is as legitimate as a district that enjoys so-called compact-
ness and contiguity. After all, in order to preserve six Democratic districts and
four Republican districts, those responsible for redistricting the state and ad-
her[ing] to the principles of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had few choices....
One must remember, moreover, that gerrymandering was invented in 1810 in
Massachusetts and not in 1992 in North Carolina.
John H. Franklin, Keynote Address at the American Issues Forum, National Humanities
Center, at 16-17 (Mar. 24, 1994) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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APPENDIX A:
AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS, 1870-1993
TABLE 1. African-Americans in the U.S. Congress, 1870-1993
United States Senate
a rte U. S. House of Representatives, continuedParty-
Member State Years
Hiram R. Revels R-MS 1870-71 William L Dawson D-IL 1943-70
Blanche K. Bruce R-MS 1875-81 Adam C. Powel, Jr. D-NY 1945-67;1969-71
Edward W. Brooke R-MA 1967-79 Charles C. Diggs, Jr. D-MI 1955-80
Carol Moseley-Braun D-IL 1993- Robert N.C. Nix D-PA 1958-78
United States House of Representatives Augustus F. Hawkins D-CA 1963-90
Joseph H. Rainey R-SC 1870-79 John Conyers. Jr. D-MI 1965-
Jefferson F. Long R-GA 1870-71 William L Clay D-MO 1969-
Robert B. Elliot R-SC 1871-74 Louis Stokes D-OH 1969-
Robert C. De Large R-SC 1871-73 Shirley A. Chisholm D-NY 1969-82
Benjamin S. Turner R-AL 1871-73 George W. Collins D-1L 1970-72
Josiah T. Walls R-FL 1871-73 Ronald V. Dellums D-CA 1971.
Richard H. Cam R-SC 1873-75;1877-79 Ralph H. Metcalfe D-IL 1971-78
John R. Lynch R-MS 1873-77;1882-83 Parren H. Mitchell D-MD 1971-86
James T. Rapier R-AL 1873-75 Charles B. Rangel D-NY 1971-
Alonzo J. Ransier R-SC 1873-75 Walter E. Fauntroy D-D.C. 1971-90
Jeremiah Haralson R-AL 1875-77 Yvonne B. Burke D-CA 1973-79
John A. Hyman R-NC 1875-77 Cardiss Collins D-1L 1973-
Charles E. Nash R-LA 1875-77 Barbara C. Jordan D-TX 1973-78
Robert Smalls R-SC 1875-79 Andrew J. Young D-GA 1973-77
James E. O'Hara R-NC 1883-87 Harold E. Ford D-TN 1975-
Henry P. Cheatham R-NC 1889-93 Bennett M. Steward D-IL 1979-80
John M. Langston R-VA 1890-91 Julian C. Dixon D-CA 1979.
Thomas E. Miller R-SC 1890-91 William H. Gray D-PA 1979-91
George W. Murray R-SC 1893-95;1896-97 Mickey Leland D-TX 1979-89
George W. White R-NC 1897-1901 Melvin Evans R-V.I, 1979-80
Oscar DePriest R-IL 1929-35 George W. Crockett. Jr. D-MI 1980-90
Arthur W. Mitchell D-IL 1935-43 Mervyn M. Dymally D-CA 1981-92
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TABLE 1, Continued
U. S. House of Representatives, continued Maxine Waters 0-CA 1991-
Gus Savage D-IL 1981-92 Lnen E. BLvnkwell D-PA 1991-
Harold Washington D-IL 1981-83 Sa.lford Bithop D-GA 1993-
Katie B. Hall D-IN 1982-84 Comne Brown' D-Fl. 1993-
Major R. Oweas D-NY 1983- Eva M. Clayton D-NC 1993-
Edolphus Towns D-NY 1983- Jaes E. Clybur D-SC 1993-
Alan Wheal D-MO 1983- Ceo Fields D-LA 1993-
Charles A. Hayes D-IL 1983-92 Alcee L- Higs D-FL 1993-
Alton R. Waldon, Jr. D-NY 1986-7 Earl F. Hllard D-AL 1993-
Mike Espy D-MS 1987-93 Eddie B. Jobnsn D-TX 1993-
Floyd H. Fake D-NY 1987- Cynthia McKinney D-GA 1993-
John Lewis D-GA 1987- Came Meek D-FL 1993-
Kweisi Mfurae D-MD 1987- Mel Reynolds 1-IL 193-
Donald M. Payne D-NJ 1989- Bobby L Rush D-IL 1;99-
Craig A. Washington D-TX 1989- Robert C. Scou D-VA 1993-
Barbara I. Collins D-MI 1991- Walter R. Tucker. M D-CA 1993-
Gary A. Franks R-Cr 1991- MeviM Wat D-NC 1993-
William J. Jefferson D-LA 1991- Albert R. Wynn D-MO 1993-
Eleanor H. Norton D-D.C. 1991- Beanie G. Thompn D-MS 1993-
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APPENDIX B:
SOUTHERN U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS BY PARTY AND BLACK
VOTE, 103RD CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
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APPENDIX C:
CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION (HOUSE AND SENATE), 1871-1993
TaYe 3.1. Congessond Repree6 ata (Ho.e and Senite). 1871-1993
TOTAL MEMBERS WHITE & O'-ER BLACK
CONGRESS YEAR OF CONGRESS MEMBERS OF CONGRESS MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
42 1871 329 324 5
43 1873 38 379 7
44 1875 391 383 8
45 1877 385 381 4
46 1879 382 381 1
47 1881 396 394 2
48 1883 422 420 2
49 1885 416 414 2
50 1887 408 408 0
51 1889 446 443 3
52 1891 444 443 1
53 1893 474 473 1
54 1895 462 481 1
55 1897 467 468 1
58 1899 471 470 1
57 1901 468 466 0
58 1903 492 492 0
59 1905 500 500 0
60 1907 502 502 0
61 1909 504 504 0
62 1911 518 518 0
63 1913 554 554 0
64 1915 543 543 0
65 1917 566 566 0
66 1919 556 556 0
67 1921 559 559 0
68 1923 557 557 0
69 1825 548 548 0
70 1927 548 548 0
71 1929 566 565 1
72 1931 558 557 1
73 1833 550 549 1
74 1935 550 549 1
75 1937 555 554 1
76 1939 560 559 1
77 1941 562 561 1
78 1943 554 553 1
79 1945 566 564 2
8 1947 553 551 2
81 1949 554 552 2
82 1951 555 553 2
83 1953 555 553 2
b4 1955 540 537 3
88 1957 545 541 4
8 1959 552 548 4
87 19561 559 555 4
88 1963 551 547 4
89 1965 549 543 6
90 1967 543 537 6
91 1989 555 544 11
92 1971 549 535 14
93 1973 545 528 17 SOURCE.
94 197S 541 523 18 Irf4.w .t"! C ,-0.?
95 1977 544 526 18 fcf C e sold Raw=ct.
96 1979 541 524 17 W4 C dCL3 s Rc-,.
97 1981 544 525 19 cl Ureed S .cn--atd
98 1983 541 520 21 .c-ce u'tm d 1
99 1985 543 52 21 d= V'cnz d cfm-1". dr
100 1987 544 521 23 Ltd S== Co e-.., 17M-
101 1989 551 527 24 lIM1 MCenJCM E- n
102 1591 536 509 27 E& Am Ar=.s. M1 TIh ft
103 1993 531 491 40 t W v S
1652 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
APPENDIX D:
NORTH CAROLINA 12 VOTING-AGE POPULATION BY RACE, AND BY
RACE AND TURNOUT
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APPENDIX E:
VOTING SCORES, WHITE NONHISPANIC DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN,
SOUTHERN STATES BY DISTRICT BLACK AND HISPANIC VOTING-AGE
POPULATIONS, 103RD CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
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APPENDIX F:
VOTING SCORES, CBC MEMBERS, SOUTHERN STATES BY DISTRICT
BLACK AND HISPANIC VOTING-AGE POPULATIONS, 103RD CONGRESS,
FIRST SESSION
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APPENDIX G:
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF CBC MEMBERS, 103RD CONGRESS
TABLE 4. Educational Background of CBC Members, 103RD Congress
Type of Degree CBC Members All Members
Doctoral 01 26
(0%) (6%)
Law 16 189
(42%) (43%)
MA/MS 8 73
Masters (20%) (17%)
MBA 2 20
(5%) (5%)
Bachelors 12 100
(32%) (23%)
No College Degree 2 28
_ __ (5%) (6%)
SOURCE: CQ. Weekly &~pom.
JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES
NOTES. The percntges for CBC -ere do rot sum to 100% because Earl Hllid (D-AL) has both a Law and an MBA
dcgr. I. Cynthia MOIG qy (D-GA) is a doctoral candidate.
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